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FROM BABY DOE TO GRANDPA DOE: THE
IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL AGE




In 1982, the news media reported the now-familiar story of "Baby Doe"-
a Bloomington, Indiana infant born with Down's Syndrome and a blocked
esophagus, who was being denied life-saving medical treatment and nourish-
ment. Following this incident, a national policy debate focused on the treat-
ment of handicapped infants. Were parents, with the acquiescence of
physicians and hospitals, withholding medical care from infants born with
physical and mental handicaps because they did not wish to keep these in-
fants alive? Or were parents simply acting on the basis of reasonable medical
judgments about the desirability of treatment? The debate also sparked a
legal controversy: could the civil rights laws be used to inquire into the
medical decisionmaking process, perhaps overturning a decision to deny
treatment to a handicapped infant?
In 1984, the federal government responded to the Baby Doe incident by
adopting regulations, pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,' that required hospitals and state child protective services agencies to
take certain actions for the protection of handicapped infants.2 The regula-
tions were challenged and ultimately struck down by the United States
* Mrs. Silver supervises appellate litigation in the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice. She wrote this article while a Visiting Fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute in 1985-1986. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
Mrs. Silver expresses her appreciation to Irv Gornstein and David Marblestone for their advice
in preparing this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 provides: "No otherwise qualified [handicapped]
individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id.
2. The regulations, then codified at 45 C.F.R. 84.55 (1985), required health care provid-
ers to notify the public that withholding medical care from infants violated the federal prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the basis of handicap and required state agencies to formulate
procedures to prevent neglect of handicapped infants and to intervene if necessary to protect a
handicapped infant's health.
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Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Association.3 What was per-
haps the most significant part of the Court's decision in Bowen, however,
was lost in the controversy over the invalidation of the government regula-
tions: the Court upheld the applicability of section 504 to a hospital's refusal
to provide medical treatment to handicapped infants.4 By so doing, the
Court exposed medical treatment decisions made by health care institutions
to scrutiny under section 504 and similar civil rights statutes.
The applicability of the civil rights laws to a hospital's medical treatment
decisions has considerable significance beyond the protection of handicapped
infants. The growing concern over spiraling health care costs has led those
advocating cost containment to suggest the rationing of medical care. Some
proposals, recognizing the public's antipathy to the notion of rationing medi-
cal care, suggest a hidden form of rationing. Instead of direct government
intervention, they favor private, and unacknowledged, rationing by health
care providers, primarily hospitals. Indeed, hospitals are already rationing
some advanced technology, notably heart transplants. The elderly are the
primary target of heart transplantation rationing. If, as this Article con-
tends, a hospital's medical treatment decisions are open to challenge by older
individuals under the civil rights laws, such as the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975 (ADA),5 hidden rationing will be exposed to scrutiny and eventually
may be prohibited.
In Part I, this Article reviews the circumstances that have led to proposals
for hidden rationing and suggests the impact such a scheme could have on
older persons. Part II examines in detail the ADA, a statute which has been
3. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). The Court first ruled that the only issue to be decided was the
validity of regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Id. at
652-26. The Court then held that the regulations exceeded the Secretary's authority because
the logical and factual bases for the regulations were insufficient to support "federal interven-
tion into a historically state-administered decisional process." Id. at 636.
The Court noted that because § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies only to pro-
grams or activities receiving federal financial assistance, it has no application to a parental
decision to withhold medical treatment from an infant. According to the Court, if treatment is
withheld under such private circumstances, the infant is not "otherwise qualified" for treat-
ment within the meaning of § 504 and the parental inaction does not violate that provision. Id.
at 630. The Court concluded that the objective of the regulations, controlling parental deci-
sionmaking, was clearly beyond the scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id.
In response to the argument that the regulations applied only to the activities of hospitals
and child protective services agencies, the Court stated that the regulations had not been con-
fined to preventing unlawful discrimination and that there was no factual basis for concluding
that those institutions had been violating § 504. Id. at 633.
4. The Court ruled that "handicapped infants are entitled to 'meaningful access' to medi-
cal services provided by hospitals, and ... a hospital rule or state policy denying or limiting
such access [is] subject to challenge under § 504." Id. at 624 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 (1985)).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982).
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virtually forgotten since its enactment. Based upon that examination, Part
III analyzes the likely impact of the ADA on the use of age as a rationing
criterion. The analysis concentrates on heart transplantation, where advanc-
ing age is currently a criterion for excluding prospective patients.
Regardless of the outcome of a challenge to the use of age as a criterion
for rationing, however, the impact of the ADA on hidden rationing will be
significant. The mere possibility of a legal challenge will expose the medical
decisionmaking process to public scrutiny-much as it did during the Baby
Doe crisis. Once hidden rationing is exposed, it cannot remain a private
matter. Public policymakers will be forced to confront the serious issues
surrounding the rationing of medical care.
I. RATIONING MEDICAL CARE
A. The Growing Pressure to Contain Health Care Costs
Until recently, national health policy has focused on increasing access to
medical care and improving its quality. The establishment of Medicare6 for
the elderly and disabled and Medicaid for the poor,7 as well as the pressures
on employers to provide health benefits, are evidence of the importance
Americans place on access to health care. Many believe that we have a
"right" to an adequate level of health care.' Consistent with this view, the
development of advanced medical technology has been seen as a positive
effort to lengthen and improve our lives.
We have paid a price, however, for the increased quality and availability
of health care. Between 1965 and 1981, total annual health care expendi-
tures in the United States increased approximately 700%.9 The percentage
of the gross national product attributable to health care has grown, in the
same period, from 6% to 10.8%. lo
The high cost of medical care, combined with the aging of our population
and resultant rise in the prevalence of chronic disease and disability, has
raised serious concerns about the continuing escalation of health care ex-
6. Id. § 1395 a-xx.
7. Id. § 1396 a-p.
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES
4, 25 (1983) [hereinafter SECURING ACCESS] ("Society has an obligation to ensure adequate
care for all."); OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 5 THE NATIONAL
HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY: FINAL REPORT, 45-37 (1985) (under contract to R. Ev-
ans & J. Broida) [hereinafter NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY].
9. 1 SECURING ACCESS, supra note 8, at 184.
10. Id.
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penditures. Despite efforts to contain health care spending, the confluence
of these factors has led some to predict that by the year 2000 the nation will
be spending almost $2 trillion on health care, a figure that will account for
fourteen percent of the gross national product."'
It is estimated that eighty percent of health care resources are devoted to
chronic disease.12 Over forty-five percent of those individuals aged sixty-five
to seventy-four have some chronic disease,'" and this percentage doubles in
those over age seventy-five. 14 Moreover, during this decade, the number of
individuals in this country who are over age seventy-five is projected to in-
crease four times as fast as the population under age sixty-five.15
Much of the increased cost of health care has been attributed to advances
in medical technology. Each year hundreds-perhaps thousands--of new
technologies are developed.' 6 Undoubtedly, some of these new technologies
save money by reducing patient care costs. Nevertheless, improved technol-
ogies are considered responsible for between twenty-five and seventy-five
percent of the increases in hospital costs.17
For example, coronary artery bypass graft surgery costs approximately
$10,000 to $20,000 per patient and accounts for expenditures of $2 billion a
year.18 The annual cost of kidney dialysis is approximately $30,000 per pa-
tient, and total costs exceed $1.5 billion. 9 The yearly price tag for neonatal
intensive care is also in the billions of dollars.20
Organ transplants are among the recent high cost "medical miracles."
Physicians save lives by transplanting human kidneys, livers, hearts, pancre-
ases, and bone marrow. The cost is considerable, ranging from $25,000 for a
kidney transplant 2' to approximately $75,000 for a heart transplant.22 Be-
11. Blendon, Health Policy Choicesfor the 1990s, 2 ISSUES IN Scl. & TECH. 65, 67 (1986).
12. Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and Ra-
tioning Decisions (pt. 1), 249 J. A.M.A. 2047, 2049 (1983) [hereinafter Evans I].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Arnet, Health Spending Trends in the 1980's: Adjusting to Financial Incentives, 6
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (1985).
16. Evans I, supra note 12, at 2049.
17. Id. at 2049-50.
18. Randall, Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 12 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 13-14 (1982).
19. Evans, Blagg & Bryan, Implications for Health Care Policy: A Social and Demo-
graphic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 J. A.M.A. 487, 490 (1981).
20. Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and Ra-
tioning Decisions (pt. 2), 249 J. A.M.A. 2208, 2212 (1983) [hereinafter Evans II].
21. HHS, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION Q AND A 2 (1985).
22. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN-
ISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE NATIONAL HEART TRANS-
PLANTATION STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-61 to 62 (1985) (under contract to R. Evans
& J. Broida) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
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cause transplant patients must continue to take immunosuppressive drugs to
prevent rejection of the transplanted organ, follow-up costs can be as much
as $6,000 to $12,000 a year.
23
Today, every discussion of health care policy priorities focuses on cost
containment. This, of course, is in line with our national emphasis on reduc-
ing government expenditures and controlling inflation.2 4 The government is
looking for ways to reduce health care spending. Employers are also search-
ing for alternate means to halt spiraling health costs. Indeed, a desire to
hold down the costs of medical care may be overtaking our interest in in-
creasing quality and access to care as our number one health policy
concern.
25
Discussions of cost containment inevitably turn to the proliferation of ex-
pensive medical technologies, especially those, such as organ transplants,
which involve high per patient costs. 26 Many serious commentators have
long asked whether it is economically feasible to make new treatments
widely available to all, regardless of cost.
2 7
B. Explicit Rationing of Medical Care
Rationing of medical care-the deliberate denial of treatment to some in-
dividuals who might benefit from it-may seem alien to our conventional
ideas about access to health care. Nevertheless, we have rationed medical
care in the past and are doing so today.2 8
23. Id. at ES-60, Table ES-19.
24. Blendon, supra note 11, at 67.
25. Access problems still exist. Approximately 11% of the population is not covered by
any form of public or private health insurance. 133 CONG. REC. E4821 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
1987) (statement of Rep. Sabo). The need for a system to finance long term care for the
chronically ill becomes critical as the population ages. Various proposals for providing long
term care for the elderly are under active consideration. Nevertheless, these issues do not have
the priority they might have had in the past. Indeed, there is a "de facto moratorium" on
proposals for national health insurance. Blendon, supra note 11, at 67-68.
26. Some attribute the problem of rising health care costs to an increased demand for low-
cost services, such as laboratory tests, rather than expensive technologies. See, e.g., Moloney
& Rogers, Medical Technology--A Different View of the Contentious Debate Over Costs, 301
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1413-14 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Baily, "Rationing" and American Health Policy, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L. 489, 499 n.2 (1984); Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Af-
fecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 250, 254 (1976); see gener-
ally, Evans I, supra note 12; Evans II, supra note 20; Mechanic, Ethics, Justice, and Medical
Care Systems, 437 THE ANNALS 74 (1978); Schwartz, We Need to Ration Medicine, NEws-
WEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 13.
28. In a sense, medical care has always been rationed. The cost of care makes it unavaila-
ble to many. Moreover, there are always limitations which result from a shortage of personnel
or facilities. This rationing has been largely unplanned and implicit.
1988)
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1. The Kidney Dialysis Experience
Kidney dialysis is perhaps the best known example of explicit medical
rationing in this country. In 1960, the development of an effective means of
artificial hemodialysis made it possible to treat patients with end stage renal
disease.2 9 The high cost of the procedure (approximately $12,000 to $15,000
a year), however, put it out of the reach of many patients.3 ° Furthermore, in
the 1960's and early 1970's, expenses related to the purchase of dialysis
equipment and the employment of hospital personnel necessary to operate a
dialysis program resulted in a shortage of treatment facilities.3 ' Hospitals
were able to provide dialysis to only a limited number of patients. As a
result, various means of rationing were employed. 32 Hospitals applied selec-
tion criteria that included age, mental acuity, family involvement, criminal
record, economic status, employment record, availability of transportation,
willingness to cooperate in the treatment regimen, likelihood of vocational
rehabilitation, psychiatric status, marital status, educational background, oc-
cupation, and future potential.33
For example, the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center created an anonymous
screening committee to choose patients. The committee was composed of a
physician, a lawyer, a housewife, a businessman, a labor leader, a state gov-
ernment official, and a minister. 34 One lay member reported his experience:
The choices were hard .... I remember voting against a young
woman who was a known prostitute. I found I couldn't vote for
her, rather than another candidate, a young wife and mother. I
also voted against a young man who [until he learned he had renal
failure] had been a ne'er do-well, a real playboy. He promised he
would reform his character, go back to school, and so on, if only he
were selected for treatment. But I felt I'd lived long enough to
know that a person like that won't really do what he was promising
at the time.35
29. The kidneys normally remove metabolic waste products from the blood stream.
When an individual has end stage renal disease, the kidneys cease to perform that function.
Hemodialysis is the artificial means of cleaning the blood. Without this treatment, a patient
with end stage renal disease will die. Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for
Victims of End-Stage Renal Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201-02 (1976).
30. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 637 (1969)
31. Rettig, supra note 29, at 201-03.
32. There have been other shortages of drugs or medical treatments which resulted in
rationing. For example, an inability to synthesize penicillin forced rationing of the drug dur-
ing World War II. See Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 239, 241.
33. Evans II, supra note 20, at 2209.
34. Note, supra note 30, at 661.
35. R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL 246 (1974).
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One pair of authors noted the "disturbing picture ... of the Seattle com-
mittee measuring persons in accordance with its own middle-class suburban
value system" and remarked ironically that "[t]he Pacific Northwest is no
place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys."36 The Seattle commit-
tee came to be known as the "God squad.""
By contrast, the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center used a lottery
to select dialysis patients. Initial screening on the basis of medical and other
criteria placed a prospective patient into either an optimal or an alternate
group. Candidates were chosen at random from the optimal group. When
that group was exhausted, patients were selected from the group of alter-
nates.3" Other hospitals employed a queue ("first-come, first-served")
system.39
The press focused national attention on the desperate plight of those need-
ing dialysis.' A government sponsored committee recommended federal fi-
nancing of hemodialysis4 By 1969, lobbying had begun in earnest.42
When Congress turned its attention to this problem in 1972, it rejected
rationing outright. Confronted by a medical technology that could save
lives, but was available to only a small percentage of those needing it, Con-
gress chose to solve the shortage by simply expanding Medicare coverage to
pay for kidney dialysis for virtually everyone.4 3 Senator Vance Hartke ar-
ticulated the fundamental question that faced Congress: "How do we ex-
plain that the difference between life and death is a matter of dollars?"'
The ease with which Congress assured universal access to kidney dialysis
was undoubtedly influenced by the nation's secure economic situation. 5
Nevertheless, unrestricted access was provided at a high price to the govern-
ment. Although initial costs were estimated at more than $30,000 a year per
36. Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney
Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 357, 378 (1968).
37. See Nightline: Medical Miracles: Can We Afford the Bill?, 4 (ABC television broad-
cast, Aug. 29, 1985).
38. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 36, at 372 n.45.
39. A queue system was used at Georgetown University Hospital, Montefiore Hospital,
Yale-New Haven Hospital, and the Veterans Administration hospitals in Portland, Oregon
and Bronx, New York. Note, supra note 30, at 659-60.
40. See, e.g., Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, 53 LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102-
04 (Seattle Artificial Kidney Center); Rettig, supra note 29, at 219-20.
41. Rettig, supra note 29, at 218.
42. Id. at 227.
43. Pub. L. No. 92-292, § 226A, 92 Stat. 307, 307 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 426-1 (1982)).
44. 118 CONG. REC. 33,003 (1972).
45. Id. at 33,007 (remarks of Sens. Jackson & Chiles). Senate debate reflected the irony of
an affluent nation allowing people to die because they could not afford the treatment.
1988]
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patient,46 they were overtaken by medical realities. The dialysis program
has grown from covering 10,000 patients in 1972, to covering 78,000 pa-
tients, at an annual cost of over $1.5 billion.4 7
2. Antipathy Toward Rationing
While the market system has traditionally been the means by which access
to goods and services is provided, Americans have been largely unwilling to
accept financial ability as the primary means of distributing medical care.
Accordingly, Congress established Medicare and Medicaid to effectuate a
national commitment to provide medical care to all, regardless of ability to
pay. While this country has not achieved universal access to health care, it
seems unlikely that we will resort to the market to govern access to new
technologies. The government's decision to provide Medicare reimburse-
ment for heart transplants4 8 demonstrates its opposition to the rationing sys-
tem that would result if federal reimbursement for new and expensive
technologies was denied.
It is certainly possible to design a rationing system, based on social worth
criteria, that is less arbitrary than the Seattle scheme.49 Selection criteria
could include life expectancy, family role, and potential future or past con-
tributions to society.5" But we reject the notion of evaluating the relative
worth of individual lives because it is inconsistent with the basic principles of
human equality.5 Even if we were willing to make the evaluation, consen-
sus would be achieved only at the extremes: preferring a research scientist
over a mass-murderer. Otherwise, there would be no general agreement on
the importance of any given criterion.
Lotteries are true to our egalitarian principles, but they expose the arbi-
trariness of random decisionmaking processes. A queue system appears less
arbitrary. "First-come, first-served" is a concept we accept in many other
contexts and the existence of a waiting list provides some certainty to the
process. Both lotteries and queues, however, produce anomalous results by
choosing patients without regard to relative benefit. In its own way, each of
these approaches to rationing offends fundamental notions of fairness. Per-
46. Id.
47. 5 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 44-11.
48. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Reshcer, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy, 79 ETHICS
173 (1969); see also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
50. Reshcer, supra note 49, at 178-79.
51. See, e.g., Childress, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live? in VALUING LIFE, PUB-
LIC POLICY DILEMMAS 203, 210 (S. Rhoads ed. 1980) ("Ultimately it dulls and perhaps even
eliminates the sense of the person's transcendence, his dignity as a person which cannot be
reduced to his past or future contribution to society.").
1000 [Vol. 37:993
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haps the most important reason for rejecting these rationing schemes, how-
ever, is that each is explicit-it exposes the fact that we are engaging in
rationing, a practice we find discomforting.
While we may be willing to make the necessary budgetary decision to
spend less on life-saving technology, such a decision is perceived as having
an impact only on "statistical lives." In contrast, when life-saving treatment
is withheld from a given individual, we are faced with the death of a known
person. Thus, rationing affects "identified lives."52 The so-called "life-sav-
ing imperative"-the belief that "life is priceless"-impels us to do every-
thing possible to save an identified life." Indeed, it is just this notion which
poses a risk of what has been labeled "symbolic blackmail"-pressure to
increase aggregate resource allocations beyond what they might otherwise be
in order to avoid denying medical care to individuals. 4
3. Medicare Reimbursement for Heart Transplants-A Recent Attempt
at Explicit Government Rationing
Medicare, the government's single largest health care program, which ac-
counts for projected expenditures of $105 billion by 1988, has been the target
of cost cutting at the national level." Medicare provides reimbursement for
"reasonable and necessary" medical care.56 In the past, the Medicare pro-
gram generally has paid for any treatment ordered by a licensed physician
52. Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1428-33 (1969); Havighurst &
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw.
U.L. REV. 6, 21-25 (1975).
53. Fried, supra note 52, at 1432.
54. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis,
59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1353 (1981). It has been suggested that this "symbolic blackmail"
applies with greatest strength to government action. Thus, Professor Blumstein has stated:
Direct public attempts to contain health care costs, however, risk governmental
identification with and responsibility for "every delayable death and preventable
hurt." Decentralized choices by nongovernmental decisionmakers such as house-
holds, labor unions, insurance companies, hospital committees, and physicians have
"greater potential for precluding symbolic concerns from becoming inextricably in-
volved in policy formulation and will likely point more attention to necessary eco-
nomic tradeoffs."
Id. at 1354 (footnotes omitted). While this may be true, the analysis seems applicable to any
system of explicit rationing, especially where the impetus for rationing is a governmental deci-
sion to limit health spending. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. It is not the
fact that rationing is private that avoids symbolic blackmail, but the fact that it is hidden.
55. Arnet, supra note 15, at II.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1982) ("no payment may be made under [Medicare part A
or B] for any expenses incurred for items or services (1)(A) which .. .are not reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a
malformed body member ... ").
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that is not considered experimental. 7
In 1979, Medicare regulators faced the issue of extending coverage to
heart transplants.5" Although most private insurance carriers and half of
the state Medicaid programs pay for heart transplants,5 9 the federal govern-
ment initially balked at a Medicare extension. No doubt the kidney dialysis
experience was fresh in the minds of federal policymakers. 6
Recognizing the potential for escalating health care costs, the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers the Medicare pro-
gram, attempted to put a halt to automatic reimbursement for new treat-
ment technologies. In 1981, HHS commissioned a study by the Battelle
Institute to evaluate the safety, efficacy and "social consequences" of "fi-
nancing the wide distribution" of heart transplants.6 This study was to "ex-
amine all aspects of heart transplants, including the scientific, social,
economic, and ethical issues."62 Presumably, HHS would make the Medi-
care coverage decision in light of all of the issues addressed in the study.63
The study was to be the "prototype" for future assessments of emerging
medical technology-a kind of "environmental impact statement for medical
innovation."'
64
The resulting National Heart Transplantation Study concluded that heart
transplant programs were achieving a high rate of success, both in terms of
57. In determining whether Medicare will cover a particular treatment, administrators
consider whether the treatment is "safe and effective, not experimental, medically necessary,
and provided according to accepted standards of medical practice in an appropriate setting."
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at ES-5. For a treatment which is not experimental,
the treating physician is generally given discretion to determine which treatment is "reasonable
and necessary." See, e.g., Breedon v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974)
(physician's decision is not binding but given "great weight"); Reading v. Richardson, 339 F.
Supp. 295, 300-01 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (citing legislative history of Medicare statute). But see
Rendzio v. Secretary of HEW, 403 F. Supp. 917, 919 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (no additional weight
given to opinion of plaintiff's physician).
58. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at ES-I.
59. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLAN-
TATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 100, 224 (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT].
60. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
61. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at ES-8 to -9.
62. Id. at ES-6.
63. In March 1980, an administrative law judge ordered Medicare to pay for a heart
transplant performed at the University of Arizona, over the objection that it was an experi-
mental procedure. Id. at ES-8. One commentator accurately described the dilemma: "Con-
fronted with a dying patient, resource allocation arguments tend to appear bureaucratic, if not
academic, to politicians and perhaps to some nonpoliticians as well." Knox, Heart Trans-
plants. To Pay or Not to Pay, 209 SCIENCE 570, 574 (1980).
64. Knox, supra note 63, at 570.
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survival and the quality of life of recipients.65 Although it was not expressly
stated,66 the study clearly concluded that heart transplantation was no
longer an experimental procedure.
In 1984, Congress addressed the growing field of organ transplantation by
enacting the National Organ Transplant Act.67 The National Organ Trans-
plant Act established a Task Force on Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion to examine the many issues surrounding organ transplantation and to
make recommendations to Congress, 68 including recommendations for as-
suring "equitable access by patients to organ transplantation" and "equitable
allocation of donated organs among transplant centers and among patients
medically qualified for an organ transplant."'69 The task force made a series
of recommendations, including Medicare and Medicaid coverage of heart
transplant expenses, as well as, public funding for individuals not covered by
Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance who could not otherwise afford
heart transplants.7"
Thus, HHS faced considerable pressure from Congress and the medical
community to cover heart transplants. Although HHS could no longer ar-
gue that the procedure was experimental, if all eligible Medicare beneficiaries
received heart transplants, the cost could be staggering."
HHS was unable to resist the pressure to provide reimbursement, and in
March, 1987, the agency issued a ruling extending Medicare coverage to
heart transplants.72 The natural scarcity of donor hearts, however, eased the
potential problems for HHS. Although potential heart transplant recipients
number in the tens of thousands, donors number only in the hundreds.73
65. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at ES-40 to -56.
66. 1 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 1-3. The study did
not make a Medicare coverage recommendation.
67. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (Supp. III
1985)).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 273 note (Supp. III 1985). The National Organ Transplant Act also pro-
hibited the sale of organs, provided funding for organ procurement agencies and established a
national organ-sharing system. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274, 274e (Supp. III 1985).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 273 note (Supp. III 1985).
70. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at 11.
71. The National Heart Transplantation Study estimated that, in 1979, there were 84,924
Medicare-eligible individuals who died of conditions for which heart transplantation might
have been indicated. 2 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8 at 13-52,
Table 13-28. At $75,000 each, the cost would exceed $6 billion. Even if only 15% of these
individuals were medically eligible for transplants, the total cost would approach $1 billion.
72. HCFA Ruling HCFAR 87-1, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 36, 216, at 13,
616 (Apr. 6, 1987) [hereinafter HCFA Ruling].
73. In 1985, 719 heart transplants were performed. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59,
at 54. The number of donors has been growing steadily. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
22, at ES-14, Table ES-4.
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Because there are so few donor hearts available, transplant programs have
applied strict patient selection criteria, including a cut-off for individuals
fifty to fifty-five years of age or older.74 The 1987 HHS ruling essentially
adopted these criteria.75  If only those under age fifty-five are considered
eligible, the vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries are excluded. 76 As a re-
sult, it is estimated that Medicare will finance only 143 transplants each year
by 1991.
77
Thus, the government effort to explicitly ration heart transplants failed.
What the public may not be aware of, however, is that heart transplants are
being rationed privately, with government approval, by means of the narrow
patient selection criteria.
C. Hidden Rationing
Can we reconcile our conflicting objectives? Can government contain
health care costs without adopting an explicit rationing system? Some be-
lieve that we can-by avoiding the appearance of rationing, while still ac-
complishing its objectives.
Respected commentators have suggested that cost containment can best
be achieved by government-imposed limits on hospital budgets and ceilings
on the amount of medical care that can be provided.7" Such action would
force health care providers to reduce the delivery of medical care by engag-
ing in hidden rationing.
1. Limiting Hospital Budgets-The British System
A study by Aaron and Schwartz describes how a system of budget con-
74. See infra text accompanying notes 122-126. According to the National Heart Trans-
plantation Study, in 1980, 14,139 persons under the age of 55 died of conditions for which a
heart transplant might have been appropriate. 2 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION
STUDY, supra note 8, at 12-33, Table 12-13. Of the 14,139, the study concluded that 13.7%
would be accepted for a transplant under current strict selection criteria. EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY, supra note 22, at ES-29. See infra. note 127.
75. The 1987 HCFA Ruling also implicitly limits the number of hospitals that can partici-
pate by imposing minimum standards of experience, staffing, resources and transplant survival
rates. HCFA Ruling, supra note 72 at 13, 638-39.
76. Generally, Medicare benefits are available only to individuals age 65 or over, and
certain disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395C (West Supp. 1988).
77. Heart Transplant Costs to Be Paid by Medicare, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A6, col.
7.
78. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL
CARE (1984); see also Blumstein, supra note 54, at 1346-56, 1386-92; Eisenberg & Williams,
Cost Containment and Changing Physicians' Practice Behavior, 246 J. A.M.A. 2195 (1981);
Havighurst, Blumstein, & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Dis-
ease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 122 (1976).
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straints operates to limit the availability of medical care in Great Britain.
Through Great Britain's system of national health insurance, expenditures
for all hospitals are limited by a budget established by the national govern-
ment. Funds are distributed through regions and districts to individual hos-
pitals. Although administrators have discretion in allocating resources, the
budget limits inevitably reduce the availability of personnel and
equipment.7 9
Physicians in Great Britain must operate within those constraints by se-
lecting some patients for treatment while rejecting others. For example, a
hospital may decide it can afford no more than ten kidney dialysis machines.
That decision operates to limit the number of patients who can receive dialy-
sis at that hospital. While the British government does not explicitly require
rationing or directly establish criteria for selection of patients, budget limits
clearly force health professionals to make rationing decisions.8 0
Perhaps the most striking example of the effects of this kind of cost con-
tainment is seen in the relative unavailability of kidney dialysis in Great Brit-
ain. The proportion of the population undergoing dialysis in the United
States in 1980 was more than three times larger than that in the United
Kingdom.8" Unlike the United States, where Medicare reimburses the cost
of treatment for everyone, in Great Britain dialysis competes with other
types of health care for government financing. The result is that many pa-
tients who would be treated in the United States are denied this lifesaving
treatment in Great Britain. 2
79. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 18-20. As Aaron and Schwartz
explain:
The effect of this system is roughly as follows. A hospital is likely to get a budget,
adjusted for inflation, that is equal to that of the preceding year unless it can make a
persuasive case for a specific additional outlay. If the cost of supplies or wages hap-
pens to rise more rapidly than the price index used by the health authorities for
adjusting budgets, the hospital administrators and staff must find ways to cut back.
Maintenance is an early casualty of restrictions on spending for current operations,
with painting cycles, for example, sometimes stretching to decades. Long-term
budget control depends on strictly enforced limits on the hiring of physicians, nurses,
and other staff. Backlogs of requests for new equipment and replacement of old
equipment grow-one piece of radiological equipment in a distinguished London
hospital is approaching its golden anniversary. The larger or more experimental the
new expenditure, the more likely that the decision about it will be made at a higher
jurisdiction, such as the region.
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 28, 96.
81. Id. at 33.
82. Aaron and Schwartz provide several other examples of areas where budget constraints
produce rationing (when compared with levels of consumption in the United States): x-ray
examinations, CT scanners, intensive care beds, and coronary artery surgery. Id. at 28.
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Among the criteria applied in Great Britain to turn away kidney dialysis
patients is the presence of other medical diseases. Age, mental illness, and
physical handicaps are also considered.13 Dialysis is rarely available to any-
one over the age of fifty-five. In explanation of this common rule of exclu-
sion, the administrator of a large community hospital explained that
"[e]veryone over fifty-five ... is 'a bit crumbly' and therefore not really a
suitable candidate for therapy."84
2. Limiting Hospital Spending in the United States-
Prospective Payment
The British system contrasts sharply with our open-ended system of pub-
lic and private third-party health care financing,8 5 through which reimburse-
ment is available for any nonexperimental treatment a physician considers
necessary or desirable.8 6 The United States system operates to create incen-
tives to provide all available care.87 As a result, professional standards of
care have evolved without consideration of availability or cost.8 8 Patients
and health professionals alike have come to expect that all beneficial treat-
ment will be provided.89
To reduce our health care costs, it is argued, we must alter the practices of
providers, since they remain the "gatekeepers" of medical care.9" One way
to accomplish that is to force hospitals to limit the availability of health
services, much as the British have done.
Expensive medical technologies are particularly susceptible to this cost
cutting. By reducing expenditures on capital equipment and highly special-
ized staff, hospitals reduce necessarily the availability of services that depend
on those resources. This type of cut is easier to accomplish than trying to
83. Id. at 34.
84. Id. at 35.
85. In this country, the vast majority of health care consumers are insulated from the
effects of rising prices by private insurance or public health care programs. Comment, Reagan
Administration Health Legislation: The Emergence of a Hidden Agenda, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 575, 577 (1983).
86. The Medicare standard of "reasonable and necessary," see supra note 56, is generally
followed by private insurers, as well. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at 230.
87. Third-party payment is virtually guaranteed and providing additional care results in
additional income to the provider. Comment, supra note 85, at 578; Cassel, Doctors and Allo-
cation Decisions. A New Role in the New Medicare, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 549, 551
(1985).
88. Cassel, supra note 87, at 551.
89. See, e.g., Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572,
1573 (1984); Siegler, Another Form of Age Discrimination, 22 ACROSS THE BOARD 8 (1985).
90. Cassel, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Implications for Policy in 1985,
6 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 291 (1984); D. MECHANIC, FUTURE ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE:
SOCIAL POLICY AND THE RATIONING OF MEDICAL SERVICES 10-11 (1979).
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reduce services that can be provided by less specialized hospital personnel
with ordinary drugs and supplies because the former has the appearance of
simply adjusting to a scarcity, without forcing physicians to deny available
care to anyone.91
If hospitals are forced to limit expenditures, they may choose to influence
physician practices by establishing treatment standards, or protocols, that
circumscribe the use of expensive treatments.9 2 Given the influence of hos-
pitals over the practices of physicians, it is argued, physicians will change
their ways and be more selective in treating individual patients.93 Even
without protocols, physicians will be forced to adjust to limited availability
of resources. A physician cannot put a patient in an intensive care unit if no
beds are available.
In this country, the federal government does not directly control total
health spending or hospital budgets. 94 Nevertheless, it exercises considera-
ble influence through federally supported health care programs. 95 The gov-
ernment's power lies in deciding what treatments it will reimburse and at
what level. Further, government influence extends beyond its own pro-
grams. For example, where a hospital has assurance that it will be reim-
bursed by Medicare for providing an expensive technology, it is more likely
91. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 110. Moreover, new technology is
an especially good target for cost cutting. The pressure of patient and physician expectations
makes it harder to curtail existing coverage or benefits than to deny reimbursement for a new
procedure. In contrast, a limitation on the availability of a new technology will not conflict
with established professional standards of care. Moreover, as each new technology is devel-
oped, third party payors have a built-in opportunity to ration by deciding not to reimburse the
costs of its use. Nevertheless, explicit rationing of new technology is difficult, as the example
of heart transplants shows. It is inevitable that the new procedure will be compared with those
already covered and decisionmakers may be hard pressed to rationalize a distinction support-
ing noncoverage.
92. Spivey, The Relation Between Hospital Management and Medical Staff Under a Pro-
spective Payment System, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984, 984-85 (1984); Note, Rethinking Medi-
cal Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1014-15
(1985).
93. Hospitals can persuade physicians to conform to established protocols by peer pres-
sure, education or threatened reduction of privileges. Spivey, supra note 92, at 985; Note,
supra note 92, at 1014-15. Physicians also have an interest in seeing that the hospitals with
which they are affiliated remain solvent. Spivey, supra note 92, at 985.
94. States have more authority to directly control expenditures and capital investment.
See, e.g., Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59
VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973). Some states, such as Massachusetts and New York, have imple-
mented mandatory controls on the growth of hospital spending. See, e.g., Iglehart, The New
Era of Prospective Payment for Hospitals, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1288, 1291 (1982).
95. These programs include Medicare, Medicaid, health care provided for veterans
through Veterans' Administration hospitals, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services for military dependents, and the Indian Health Service.
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to make the capital investment necessary to provide the technology. 96
In 1982 and 1983, Congress enacted legislation altering the system of re-
imbursing hospitals under Medicare.9 7 Reimbursement based on a pro-
vider's "reasonable cost"9 " was replaced with a prospective payment
system.99 Under the new system, providers are paid according to a fixed
formula based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG) into which the pa-
tient's illness falls. loO The DRG formula is set at a rate expected to cover all
services provided by the hospital, including diagnosis and treatment.10 1 Re-
gardless of the services actually rendered or the actual length of hospitaliza-
tion, the hospital will be paid at the fixed rate.
Prospective payment was adopted as a cost cutting measure. As such, it
creates incentives to reduce the cost of services available to patients. 1 0 2 Only
by keeping costs within DRG payment rates can hospitals hope to avoid a
financial Ioss.103 This has created serious concerns that costs will be cut by
96. HHS approved reimbursement for heart transplants only in facilities which meet strin-
gent criteria. See supra note 75. At the same time, facilities are expected to apply those crite-
ria to all heart transplant patients, including those ineligible for Medicare reimbursement.
HCFA Ruling, supra note 72 at 13,639.
97. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, 97 Stat. 65, 149
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, 96 Stat. 324, 331 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). This was not the government's first attempt to limit the availability of
health services. See Comment, supra note 85, at 581-82.
98. The Medicare statute provided that "[t]he amount paid to any provider of services...
with respect to services for which payment may be made under this [title] shall ... be (1)(A)
the reasonable cost of such services ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b) (1982). The necessity and
efficiency of costs were not considered. Under the cost-based reimbursement scheme, hospitals
had no incentive to hold down costs since they would be reimbursed for all covered health
care. Comment, supra note 85, at 585-86. As a result, Medicare costs far exceeded projec-
tions. In 1970, Medicare costs of $4.95 billion were more than twice the amount originally
projected for that year, in the 1965 projections. Id. at 580.
99. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 149 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
100. Comment, supra note 85, at 589. There are 467 diagnosis-related groups based on the
patient's primary and secondary diagnoses, the patient's age, the primary and secondary proce-
dures used, complications experienced, and concurrent diseases. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 587.
102. Cassel, supra note 90, at 291; Lave, Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare, 62
MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 251, 261 (1984).
103. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 100-
02 (1985). The Office of Technology Assessment Report notes several ways in which the pro-
spective payment system has the potential to affect access to health care: through effects on
the number and distribution of hospital beds, through effects on the admissions policies of
hospitals, through effects on the transfer policies of hospitals, and through effects on treatment
received after admission to the hospital. Id. at 98-105. The Report notes that the system
might create financial incentives to hospitals to stop treating certain diagnosis-related groups
(DRG) or certain high cost patients (including the "frail elderly" and alcoholics) within a
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reducing staff or patient services."o The indirect result of this payment sys-
tem is to reduce the availability of expensive technology. Absent an assur-
ance that they will be reimbursed for its use, hospitals are less likely to invest
in expensive equipment and specialized staff.' °5 Nevertheless, proponents
deny it will have an impact on the quality of care offered to Medicare pa-
tients. They contend that prospective payment is simply intended to elimi-
nate waste and inefficiency in the health care delivery system. 106
Disagreement about whether such restraints will eliminate waste or deny
care to those who need it arises from differing views of the propriety of cur-
rent standards of care. Of course, the severity of the reduction in care will
depend on how tightly government pulls the purse strings. 107 It seems clear,
however, that the intent of prospective payment, at least in part, is to alter
current levels of care.'0o Whether this is considered good or bad policy, it is
likely to operate to deny care to individuals who could benefit from it.'° 9 To
that extent, it will result in rationing.
Through this means of cost containment, the government may bring about
rationing without mandating it, or even acknowledging that rationing exists.
It creates a scarcity that results in hidden rationing by health care providers.
3. How Hidden Rationing Works
The kind of hidden rationing that results from resource limits on health
care providers has been advocated for several reasons. Using medical crite-
ria as the basis for decisionmaking may avoid the appearance of rationing.
Physicians are perceived as simply choosing those for whom treatment is
medically suitable. "o
given DRG. Id. at 99. Where hospitals continue to treat all patients, they might adopt a
practice of differential treatment of Medicare and other patients. Id. at 102.
104. See, e.g.. Brown, The Rationing of Hospital Care in 2 SECURING ACCESS, supra note 8,
at 253, 277; Cassel, supra note 87, at 553; Comment, supra note 85, at 594.
105. See supra note 79.
106. See, e.g., Hospital Prospective Payment System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983) (statement of Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services Richard Schweiker); Comment, supra note 85, at 588.
107. Mild budget limits might do no more than "subject hospitals to some of the cost
discipline that competitive businesses routinely face, but from which hospitals are sheltered by
present methods of reimbursement [by] squeez[ing] out pure waste and reduc[ing] amenities
for patients and staff." H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 123. The problem with
mild limits, however, is that savings would be small. Id.
108. Spivey, supra note 92, at 984-85.
109. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 122; cf Hadley, How Should Medicare
Pay Physicians?, 62 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 279, 280-81 (1984) ("If fiscal pressures dictate
that Medicare spend less for physician services... then any changes made to meet that objec-
tive will result in reductions in either beneficiary access to care and/or quality of that care.").
110. This kind of rationing system has the potential for creating a financial conflict between
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Indeed, British experience suggests that physicians are expected to ration-
alize the limitations placed on them by resource constraints. By redefining
professional standards of care, physicians can advise patients that they are
receiving all appropriate care.'1 ' To avoid difficult choices, physicians may
welcome the development of hospital treatment protocols on which they can
rely." 2 Thus, the rationing which is hidden within the medical decision-
making process could avoid the "symbolic blackmail""' 3 associated with
other forms of rationing because it preserves the fiction that everything of
medical value is being done for the individual patient.
This kind of rationing scheme results largely in "aresponsible allocation"
of health care because the decisionmakers are not publicly accountable."1 4
Selection standards may not be articulated, but, even where they are, they
are not acknowledged as rationing standards. Moreover, the notion that any
inquiry will interfere with the practice of medicine protects the decisionmak-
ing process from scrutiny.' 15
Hidden rationing is advocated because it hides from public scrutiny the
"explicit ordering of sensitive priorities and overt interpersonal comparisons,
providers and patients, causing "a fundamental shift away from the traditional physician-pa-
tient relationship based on trust and agency." Hadley, supra note 109, at 286-87. Some have
warned against altering the role of the physician as patient advocate. See, e.g., Fried, Rights
and Health Care-Beyond Equity and Efficiency, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 241, 242 (1975).
111. Aaron and Schwartz describe the means by which British physicians deal with the
shortage of kidney dialysis services.
Confronted by a person older than the prevailing unofficial age cutoff for dialysis,
the British GP tells the victim of chronic renal failure or his family that nothing can
be done except to make the patient as comfortable as possible in the time remaining.
The British nephrologist tells the family of a patient who is difficult to handle that
dialysis would be painful and burdensome and that the patient would be more com-
fortable without it; or he tells the resident alien from a poor country that he should
return home, to be among family and friends who speak the same language-where,
as it happens, the patient will die because dialysis is unavailable.
In each instance physicians are asserting that the treatment is medically optimal or
very close to optimal, that patients denied care or provided alternative forms of care
because of budget limits lose essentially nothing of medical significance. For the
undialyzed patient with renal failure who dies .... this view is unpersuasive even if
the underlying judgment that resources must be limited is correct. But it enables
doctors to avoid the painful realization that they are doing less than the best for the
patient.
H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 101.
112. "[M]edical practice is characterized by considerable uncertainty as to the amount of
care necessary." D. MECHANIC, supra note 90, at 98. If we are going to ask physicians to
ration medical care, uniform standards should be adopted.
113. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
114. Mehlman, supra note 32, at 274-75.
115. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 52, at 57.
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which are bound to have demoralizing effects in an egalitarian democratic
society. '  Advocates of such a rationing scheme contend that avoiding
government involvement eliminates the kind of legal scrutiny that can seri-
ously impede the whole rationing process.'
1 7
Nevertheless, rationing, even by physicians, is still rationing. Medical
decisionmaking requires an evaluation of a patient's need for treatment and
its probable success or futility. When decisionmakers go beyond this deter-
mination, however, to establish priorities for treatment, they are not making
a medical decision, but, rather, a social policy decision. That decision may
be based upon medical efficacy, that is, choosing the patient with the best
chance of survival, or it may be based upon other criteria of social utility,
but it is still rationing." 8
4. Heart Transplants: An Example of Hidden Rationing
The patient selection criteria for heart transplants demonstrate the
problems inherent in rationing by medical criteria. Generally, patients are
deemed eligible if they have a critical medical need for a transplant, meaning
that they have little likelihood of surviving more than six months without a
transplant. Generally, these individuals are invalids for whom no other
treatment is expected to be successful." 9 However, because the number of
patients who qualify under these strict criteria exceeds the supply of donor
hearts, further screening is necessary and physicians must ration among pro-
spective patients.
When the HHS commissioned the National Heart Transplantation
Study, 2 ' it published suggested eligibility criteria, developed by the Na-
tional Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 2 ' for prospective heart transplant
patients. Although the criteria vary, hospitals that perform heart trans-




117. Blumstein, supra note 54, at 1356-85.
118. It may be necessary to apply medical criteria about need and prospects of success even
when making a policy decision. That fact may operate to obscure the distinction between
medical and policy decisionmaking. For example, only a physician, applying medical criteria,
can choose patients with the best chance of survival.
119. 46 Fed. Reg. 7072, 7073 (1981).
120. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
121. 46 Fed. Reg. 7072, 7073-74 (1981).
122. Of the six transplant programs participating in the national study, five explicitly in-
cluded an age cut-off of 50 or 55 in their patient selection criteria. See 1 NATIONAL HEART
TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 8-18 (Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center), 8-
31 (Medical College of Virginia), 8-50 (University of Minnesota), 8-58 (University of Pitts-
burgh), 8-66 (Stanford University Medical Center).
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1. Advancing age, beyond the age (usually fifty or fifty-five) at which the
"individual begins to have diminished capacity to withstand postoperative
complications."' 23
2. Comorbid conditions, including severe pulmonary hypertension, se-
vere liver or kidney dysfunction, active systemic infection, recent pulmonary
infarction, insulin-requiring diabetes mellitus, significant peripheral or cer-
ebrovascular disease, acute peptic ulcers, or any other systemic disease
"likely to limit or preclude survival and rehabilitation after
transplantation."1
24
3. History of a behavior pattern (including drug or alcohol addiction) or
psychiatric illness "likely to interfere significantly with compliance with a
disciplined medical regimen." '125
4. "Absence of adequate external psychosocial supports for either short
or long-term. "126
Physicians undoubtedly would describe all of the patient selection criteria
for heart transplants as medical criteria because they are designed to pro-
duce a successful clinical outcome.127 For example, some of the "comorbid
conditions" are considered disqualifying because a patient who has one of
these conditions may be unable to survive a transplant or the use of immu-
nosuppressive drugs, which are necessary to avoid rejection of the trans-
123. 46 Fed. Reg. 7072, 7073 (1981).
124. Id. at 7074.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The use of these criteria is reinforced by the adoption of HHS Medicare reimburse-
ment requirements. The HHS ruling adopts essentially the same patient selection criteria.
HCFA Ruling, supra note 72, at 13,641. Among the "strongly adverse factors" is "advancing
age." The ruling states:
a. Strongly adverse factors include: (1) Advancing age; for example, a patient be-
yond 53 to 57 years of age (the mid 50's). Until not long ago, limited experience with
patients over age 50 showed that these patients had both impaired capacity to with-
stand post-operative immunosuppressive complications and lessened survival. More
recently, carefully selected patients through age 55 have had good survival experi-
ence: but experience with patients beyond age 55 is limited. The selection of any
patient for transplantation beyond age 50 must be done with particular care to ensure
an adequately young "phsysiologic" age and the absence or insignificance of coexist-
ing disease.
Id. Although these are characterized as guidelines, hospitals which select patients who fall
"far outside" the selection criteria will not be eligible for Medicare funding. Id. at 13,625.
Those who do not meet all the criteria are not considered "suitable transplant candidate[s]."
Id. Use of the criteria is reinforced by reporting requirements. Id. at 13,639. Moreover, be-
cause hospitals must achieve a one and two year actuarial survival rate of 73% and 65%
respectively, id. at 13,638-39, 13,627, hospitals have a strong incentive to use these narrow
selection criteria. Indeed, HHS expects these criteria to apply to all patients, including those
ineligible for Medicare reimbursement. Id. at 13,639.
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plant. 2 ' Behavioral history and "external psychosocial supports," such as
the support of family, friends, employer, and co-workers, are considered rel-
evant to the patient's ability to adapt to the necessary alterations of lifestyle,
including adherence to a strict diet, a medication regimen, and other
restrictions. 2 9
Although the published patient selection criteria are medical criteria, they
do more than identify those for whom a heart transplant is a medically suita-
ble treatment: they provide a basis for choosing among those individuals.
To identify those for whom a transplant is medically indicated, the physician
would ask only whether the benefits to a certain patient outweigh the risks of
treatment. With patients who are estimated to live no longer than six
months without a transplant, and who choose to undergo the complex sur-
gery and aftercare, the answer would seem to be that anyone whose life can
be extended for a substantial period of time would benefit. 3 '
Beyond this, however, the criteria seem to reflect social worth considera-
tions. By utilizing age and "potential for rehabilitation" after transplanta-
tion, they seem to favor those patients who are expected to live longer and
have a higher "quality of life." 13 ' While the medical profession considers
them to be criteria of medical suitability for treatment,' 32 the criteria also
seem to embody certain social value judgments.
33
128. 46 Fed. Reg. 7073-74 (1981).
129. Id. at 7074.
130. Indeed, no one suggests that every individual who fails to meet the established profile
will be unable to survive a transplant. If more donor hearts were available, or if the artificial
heart became a viable alternative to human heart transplantation, purely medical criteria
would necessarily expand eligibility. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at ES-102.
The kidney dialysis experience demonstrates that medical criteria respond to considerations
of availability and funding. In 1972, there were 10,000 patients on kidney dialysis; over the
years, the number has risen to 78,000. In significant part, this is due to a relaxation of selec-
tion criteria, so that dialysis is provided to older and sicker patients. For example, before
1972, only seven percent of dialysis patients were over 55. By 1978, more than 45% were over
55. Id. at ES-103, Table ES-26.
131. According to the Task Force on Organ Transplantation, the "prevailing ethos and
practice are to allocate organs to the recipient who will live the longest with the highest quality
of life." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at 87.
132. The American Medical Association has stated its position on rationing: "Limited
health care resources should be allocated efficiently and on the basis of fair, acceptable, and
humanitarian criteria. Priority should be given to persons who are most likely to be treated
successfully or have long term benefit. Social worth is not an appropriate criterion." AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ALLOCATION OF HEALTH RESOURCES, OPINION 2.02, CUR-
RENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 2
(1982). Thus, physicians may not distinguish clearly between medical and social worth
criteria.
133. An unstable behavioral or psychological history (including alcoholism and drug ad-
diction) and the absence of external psychosocial supports would seem to reflect other social
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The British experience 34 should warn us that social worth criteria may
appear in the guise of medical criteria. This nation's experience with kidney
dialysis demonstrates that there is little medical justification for excluding
those over age fifty five and those who are mentally ill from kidney dialy-
sis. 1 35  Similarly, the heart transplant criteria may reflect considerations
other than medical efficacy. Moreover, it is easy to see that an aresponsible
decisionmaking process increases the chances that the decisionmakers' per-
sonal value judgments come into play.136 The medical and social worth con-
siderations may overlap and be difficult to distinguish. Thus, hidden
rationing by health care providers does not eliminate the problems evident in
other forms of rationing.
5. Older Persons: Likely Targets of Hidden Rationing
Older persons seem particularly susceptible to efforts at rationing.
3 7
There is an intuitive basis for concluding that an older person has less
chance of achieving a successful clinical outcome. Thus, it may be relatively
easy for some to accept the notion that, as the British doctor expressed it, as
we get older we all get "a bit crumbly"' 13' and, therefore, are at greater risk
in undergoing medical treatment. Furthermore, to the extent that we at-
tempt to cut costs by reducing efforts that prolong the process of dying,
worth considerations. The latter criterion, especially, can be expected to disfavor members of
certain economic and social groups.
A recent study compared the population of hemodialysis patients in 1967, before Medicare
coverage of dialysis, with the number of hemodialysis patients in 1978, after coverage was
extended. It found that although blacks constituted 24% of those with end stage renal disease,
they represented only seven percent of the hemodialysis population in 1967. By 1978,
although blacks still constituted 24. 1% of those with end stage renal disease, the number of
blacks receiving dialysis rose dramatically to 34.9%. Evans, Blagg & Bryan, supra note 19, at
488-89.
134. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
135. After Medicare began paying for kidney dialysis, the percentage of patients over 55
rose to 45.7%, indicating that they were considered medically eligible. EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY, supra note 22, at ES-103.
136. See Mehlman, supra note 32, at 258; Note, supra note 30, at 662.
137. This analysis may be equally true of the handicapped who may be adversely affected
by rationing decisions based upon anticipated "quality of life." One of the primary reasons for
enactment of the antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982), was to protect against society's willingness to accept unproven generalizations about
the capacities of the handicapped. The Baby Doe cases are one example. See supra notes 1-3
and accompanying text. Moreover, there is evidence that physicians have allocated intensive
care resources based upon evaluation of continued ability to interact meaningfully with others.
Mulley, The Allocation of Resources for Medical Intensive Care, in 3 SECURING ACCESS, supra
note 8, at 185, 302. This Article focuses on the elderly, however, because they represent a
much larger percentage of the population and of health care costs.
138. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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some may choose to start with the elderly because they are more likely to see
illnesses of the aged in those terms.139
At the same time, there is a certain rationality to reserving scarce health
care resources for those who hold jobs, have young families, and have their
"whole lives ahead of them." Aaron and Schwartz viewed this as an expla-
nation for the bias against care of the elderly in the British system. t4
Although painfully frank, Colorado Governor Richard Lamm's suggestion
that the terminally ill who are old should die and get out of the way of the
young 14 may reflect a widely accepted view of resource allocation.
Moreover, the characteristics of the elderly render them a prime target for
rationing medical care. As a group, they are sicker and require more expen-
sive care. Indeed, their treatment costs are largely responsible for spiraling
health care expenditures. Because medical and social policy reasons for us-
ing age as a patient selection criterion overlap, the elderly are likely targets
of health care rationing.
6. Examining Rationing Decisions
The true nature of the patient selection criteria for heart transplants, and
similar criteria for other medical procedures, cannot be determined without
subjecting such criteria to critical scrutiny. One opportunity for such scru-
tiny is through legal challenge. Proponents of hidden rationing contend that
the standards are not open to broad scale legal inquiry because they involve
only private action within the generally protected area of medical prac-
tice. 142 In reaching that conclusion, however, those proponents have over-
looked an area of federal law that is directly applicable to private
decisionmaking by hospitals-the federal civil rights laws.
139. See Siegler, supra note 89, at 10.
140. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 96-97.
141. Gov. Lamm Asserts Elderly, If Very Ill, Have 'Duty to Die, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29,
1984, at A16, col. 5.
142. Professor Blumstein contends that individual patients will be adequately protected
from unfair treatment by state tort law. Blumstein, supra note 54, at 1395-1400. This is far
from clear.
There are three ways in which a rationing decision to deny medical care could result in tort
liability. First, a physician who refuses treatment or discharges a patient prematurely without
affording him or her an opportunity to obtain alternative care may be found to have committed
the intentional tort of abandonment. See, e.g., Spendlove v. Georges, 4 Utah 2d 392, 295 P.2d
336 (1956), Hall v. Nagel, 139 Ohio 265, 39 N.E.2d 612 (1942).
Second, concealing from a patient the availability of a treatment may expose the physician
to a claim of tortious failure to obtain the patient's informed consent. See, e.g., Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Truman v. Thomas, 27
Cal. 3d 285, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902, (1980).
Third, a physician will be liable in a malpractice action if he or she fails to exercise due care,
that is, the degree of care customarily exercised by members of the medical profession. See W.
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The remainder of this Article will discuss the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 (ADA) and its impact on the use of age as a patient selection criterion.
Because age is currently being used as a rationing criterion for heart trans-
plants, the analysis will focus on whether that use can survive scrutiny under
the ADA.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975
The ADA 14 3 is modeled after title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which broadly prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and na-
tional origin in programs and activities supported with federal financial
assistance.'" Title VI had its origin in the notion that "simple justice" re-
quires that funds of the United States, derived from the tax dollars of citi-
zens of all races, should not be used to support racial discrimination.
145
Since its passage, that basic philosophy has been extended to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex through the Education Amendments of
1972,146 on the basis of handicap through section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973'1 7 and, on the basis of age through the ADA.
Section 6102 of the ADA provides: "... no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance." 148 While the ADA employs prohibi-
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 162-64 (4th ed. 1971). Under that standard, if
rationing becomes customary, the physician who rations may not be considered negligent.
The doctrines of abandonment and informed consent also seem to rely upon customary
standards of care. That is, a physician would not be liable for failing to provide treatment or
information which is not customarily provided by physicians. Of course, changes in custom
are gradual and in the transition period there may be inconsistent rulings on malpractice liabil-
ity.
Some states have adopted a more stringent standard of accepted or expected practice. See,
e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970). This standard
would make it more difficult to defend rationing.
Tort law seems to be based on the assumption that it is customary practice to provide all
beneficial care. For that reason, it is not readily adaptable to a rationing situation.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6. Section 601 contains the prohibitory language which
is the essence of title VI: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000d.
145. See 119 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6561 (remarks of
Sen. Kuchel).
146. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982). The coverage of the Age Discrimination Act (ADA) is lim-
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tory language identical to that of title VI, the analogy is not complete. Un-
like title VI, the ADA contains several broad exceptions to the basic
prohibition. This difference reflects a congressional understanding that
while distinguishing among individuals on the basis of race is always unfair,
"age may often be a reasonable distinction."1 49
The ADA contains two exemptions from coverage. Section 6103(b)(2)
provides an exemption for "any program or activity established under au-
thority of any law" which "provides any benefits or assistance to persons
based upon the age of such persons" or "establishes criteria for participation
in age-related terms or describes intended beneficiaries or target groups in
such terms."1 5° In addition, section 6103(c) excludes most employment
practices. 5 ' With the exception of programs receiving financial assistance
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1974, regulation
of age discrimination in employment was left to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.152
There are also three exceptions to the ADA's basic prohibition against age
discrimination. Section 6103(b)(1) provides that action otherwise prohibited
by section 6102 does not violate the Act when:
"(A) such action reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to
[1] the normal operation or [2] the achievement of any statutory objective of
such program or activity; or (B) the differentiation made by such action is
ited to programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 332, 334.
149. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1321, 1323 [hereinafter 1975 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT].
150. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2). The original implementing regulations adopted by the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) interpreted this provision to exempt age
distinctions contained in any federal, state or local statute or ordinance adopted by an elected,
general purpose legislative body. 45 C.F.R. § 90.3(b)(1) (1987). At the same time, the Depart-
ment rejected the argument that age distinctions authorized by regulations should also be ex-
empt. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,772 (1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 90). See infra note 252 and
accompanying text.
151. Section 6103(c) provides:
(1) Except with respect to any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance for public service employment under the Job Training Partnership Act (29
U.S.C.A. § 1501 et seq.), nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
tion under this chapter by any Federal department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization, or
with respect to any labor-management joint apprenticeship training program.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or modify the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634), as amended, or to
affect the rights or responsibilities of any person or party pursuant to such Act.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6103(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
152. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
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based upon reasonable factors other than age."'' 13
Congressional ambivalence about the propriety of differentiating among
program beneficiaries on the basis of age is evident in the legislative history
of the ADA. Despite scant evidence of the existence of age discrimination,
Congress made clear its belief that the problem was sufficient to warrant a
legislative solution. At the same time, its broadly worded exceptions vali-
date many age distinctions.' 54
One might normally look to the legislative history for guidance in separat-
ing the permissible from the impermissible uses of age distinctions under the
statute. Unfortunately, Congress appears never to have faced up to that dif-
ficult task. Nevertheless, the legislative history does reveal that Congress
was particularly concerned with the discriminatory use of certain age dis-
tinctions when it enacted the ADA.
A. Passage of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975
The ADA was enacted in 1975 as part of the Older Americans Amend-
ments of 1975, an omnibus bill providing a broad range of programs for the
elderly.' 55 The idea of barring age discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams seems to have originated with Arthur S. Flemming, the influential
former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, now
known as the Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. Flemming
simultaneously held the positions of HEW Commissioner on Aging and
Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1975. In tes-
timony before a subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Commit-
tee, which, early in 1975, was considering reauthorization of the Older
Americans Act of 1965, Dr. Flemming condemned "ageism"-implying
that, along with racism and sexism, it was pervasive in this country. 156
Although the House hearings included no further discussion of the sub-
ject, the bill reported by the House committee contained a ban on age dis-
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1).
154. It is not the purpose of this Article to address whether the existence of age discrimina-
tion justified passage of legislation. Rather, this Article identifies the problem Congress sought
to reach and suggests that the statute be interpreted in light of that original concern.
155. The Older Americans Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, 89 Stat. 713, (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3057g (1982)), reauthorized and modified a set of programs for the
elderly, ranging from nutrition services to community service employment, originally adopted
in the Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3056 (1982)).
156. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975). Dr. Flemming expressed his
"hope that the day will come when the Civil Rights Act will be amended to include age as well
as sex" discrimination. Id.
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crimination.' 7 The House report pointed out the "non-involvement of
older persons" as workers and volunteers which, the committee concluded,
was often the result of "deep-seated prejudice against the elderly."15 8 That
prejudice, the report continued, served to deny the elderly opportunities
"solely because they have reached a given age" and without consideration of
the "merits of each case.'" 59
The report noted also that "prejudices against the aged" are reflected in
the failure to provide older persons with their "fair share" of services in the
areas of health, education, and transportation."6 For specific examples of
age discrimination, the report relied on two White House conferences on
aging and the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.161
The House report concluded that it was "clear .. . that discrimination
against old persons is still widespread."'
162
The bill passed the House with little debate.' 63 Although it prohibited age
discrimination in federally assisted programs, the hearings and debate had
done little to identify the need for such a prohibition, and even less to ex-
plain the scope of that prohibition.
In the Senate, Dr. Flemming testified before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. There, he supported the need for
legislation by reference to cases of age discrimination in employment.' 64 He
went on to detail what he considered to be the under-representation of older
persons in federally assisted service programs, including community health
centers, community mental health centers, rehabilitation programs, social
services, legal services, education programs, employment programs, and rev-
enue sharing.' 65 Dr. Flemming attributed this under-representation, which
had been cited in the House committee report, to discrimination and stated
that "[b]ecause older people are viewed as being less able to find employment
or unable to work, they are not provided services or sought out as program
participants." 
66
157. H.R. 3922, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. title III (1975); see H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1975).
158. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 16.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); id. at 9231 (re-
marks of Rep. Solarz); id. at 9217 (remarks of Rep. Randall).
164. Legislation to Extend the Older Americans Act. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 1425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 389
(1975).
165. Id. at 390-91.
166. Id. at 390.
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Although the Senate subcommittee reported a bill similar to that which
had passed the House, the full committee was more reluctant. 167 Then
HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger had written to the committee expressing
the Administration's serious reservations about the legislation. Weinberger
cautioned that the House bill "would leave to the Executive Branch . . .
momentous policy decisions in wholly uncharted areas without the benefit of
any specific legislative guidance." 16' He went on to raise a number of ques-
tions about the scope of the statutory exceptions.
1 69
Weinberger's letter had an influence on the Senate committee.171 In its
report, the committee expressed the need for more information to determine
"the causes, scope, nature, and extent of age discrimination in federally as-
sisted programs" so that the "need for additional legislation ... can be fairly
and reasonably assessed."' 71 The bill reported out of committee and passed
by the Senate 172 replaced the prohibition on age discrimination with direc-
167. The Senate subcommittee had approved a bill almost identical to that which passed
the House. S. REP. No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1252.
168. Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger to Harrison A. Williams (June 18, 1975); S. REP.
No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1278.
169. The letter stated:
Neither the bill nor its legislative history indicates what factors would be "reason-
able." Even a very preliminary review of the potential ramifications suggests a myr-
iad of unexplored issues such as the following:
Is it "reasonable" for school systems to exclude three-year-olds from kindergarten
classes? Or eleven-year-olds from high school classes?
Can a medical or dental school bar a 50-year-old person from taking one of its
limited classroom seats because his or her life expectancy suggests a practice of rela-
tively brief duration?
Is it "reasonable" to limit reduced-fare or free public transportation to those age
65 or over?
Can existing guaranteed housing loans and senior citizen housing programs be lim-
ited to specific age groups?
At what age would a person be deemed to be sufficiently mature to consent to
sterilization, to receive family planning information or to elect specific medical
treatment?
S. REP. No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1278-79.
170. On the Senate floor, Senator Eagleton stated that the committee had been influenced
by "the seriousness of the concerns expressed" in Secretary Weinberger's letter. 121 CONG.
REC. 21,172 (1975).
171. S. REP. No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1272. The Senate Committee did not reject the conclusion that there was age
discrimination in federally assisted programs. Indeed, it stated that there was "some evidence
that older persons are unreasonably discriminated against" and expressed concern about re-
ports of discrimination in access to educational institutions and mortgages. Id.
172. S. 1425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1975).
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tions to the Civil Rights Commission to conduct a one-year study of the
problem.
In conference, negotiations bogged down over the two very different ver-
sions of the title which was to become the ADA, threatening passage of the
entire Older Americans Act. 173 Eventually, the conferees arrived at an awk-
ward "compromise": they would combine both the House and Senate ap-
proaches. The final legislation prohibited discrimination and mandated a
study to determine the extent and nature of that discrimination.
174
The conference did nothing to clarify the standard to be applied in scruti-
nizing age distinctions under the legislation. However, it did make one
change. The conference amended the statement of purpose enunciated in
section 6101 to add the term "unreasonable." Thus, the announced purpose
of the ADA was to prohibit not all age discrimination, but only that which
was "unreasonable." 175 It is far from clear that this added anything to the
statute's meaning. Although the Conference Report noted that the operative
prohibitory language of section 6102 was to be "modified by considerations
of reasonableness," 1 76 the actual language of section 6102 did not incorpo-
rate that term. Instead, the basic prohibition was modified by the statutory
exceptions. 177 The scope of those exceptions was never explained.
Although the conferees recognized the importance of resolving these is-
sues, they acknowledged that there was no "clear consensus" among the
members of Congress on which age-based distinctions would violate the
ADA. 178 While the conference report candidly admitted the existence of
"basic differences on the extent to which age may validly be taken into ac-
count"'171 in determining eligibility for federally assisted programs, the legis-
lative history is so sparse that the different views cannot even be identified.
Indeed, there is no evidence that any member of Congress seriously tried to
173. See 121 CONG. REC. 37,735 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
174. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 54-59, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1321-26.
175. Pub. L. No. 94-135, § 302, 89 Stat. 713, 728 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § (1982));
see also 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 54, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1321.
176. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 56, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1323.
177. Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1323. For a discussion on
the standard applicable to the principal normal operation exception, see infra notes 258-90 and
accompanying text.
178. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 56, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1323.
179. Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1323.
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address the complex definitional issues.1 80
Senator Eagleton described the problem:
I share the concern of the Members of the House, who sup-
ported these provisions so strenuously, that there may be otherwise
qualified individuals who are denied access to such programs solely
because of their age, but I could never get satisfactory answers to
certain fundamental questions, such as "Which programs? In
what numbers? Who decides what age discrimination is
unreasonable?"
This last question of reasonableness is of the utmost importance,
Mr. President, for unlike race discrimination, age discrimination is
not per se arbitrary. Our laws commonly make distinctions among
individuals based upon their age, often for the purpose of defining
those eligible for a particular kind of Government benefit, such as
social security, or for describing the target group for a particular
piece of legislation, just as this bill is designed to aid older Ameri-
cans. So it is not all age discrimination that we want to prohibit,
but only that which is unreasonable.
And what is unreasonable age discrimination? Whatever it is
cannot be determined from the bill, for it simply prohibits "unrea-
sonable age discrimination" and tosses the ball to the executive
branch to determine what is reasonable and unreasonable. 
1 8
Instead of resolving these "fundamental" policy questions' 8 2 before enact-
ing the ADA, the conferees agreed on two provisions which they hoped
would lead to its resolution. First, as discussed above, they directed the
Civil Rights Commission to undertake a study identifying current examples
of "unreasonable" age discrimination in federally assisted programs and to
obtain the views of interested parties, including federal agencies, on the rea-
sonableness of age-based distinctions in such programs. 3 Second, they pro-
vided that the Act would not be self-executing, but would be effectuated by
federal agency regulations and enforced only by fund termination and other
180. The only exception was Representative Quie, who provided some explanation for the
"statutory objective" exception:
Thus, in a bill providing grants for the improvement of reading in the elementary
grades, but for which a relatively small sum had been appropriated, the decision
could be made to concentrate the effort on the first three grades even though this
discriminates against older children. The basis of the decision would be that other-
wise the objective of the program would be defeated.
121 CONG. REC. 37,299 (1975).
181. Id. at 37,735.
182. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 57, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1324.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 6106 (1982).
[Vol. 37:9931022
ADA and Hidden Rationing of Medical Care
means of agency enforcement pursuant to those regulations. 184
The statute established a timetable whereby the prohibitory provisions
would not become effective until January 1, 1979,85 after the Civil Rights
Commission completed its report and agency regulations were issued.'8 6
Postponement of the effective date was intended to give Congress the oppor-
tunity to reexamine the ADA after the Commission issued its report and
before enforcement began. 187 The Older Americans Act was due to expire in
1978 and it was anticipated that consideration of the ADA could be under-
taken as part of the reauthorization process.
B. The 1978 Amendments
When Congress reexamined the statute in 1978, it reaffirmed the need for
the ADA by retaining the statute largely intact. It failed, however, to clarify
the standard to be applied in interpreting its provisions.
In January, 1978, the Civil Rights Commission issued its report on age
discrimination."8 8 Based on its study of ten federally assisted programs, 8 9
the Commission made findings and a number of recommendations.
For purposes of its study, the Commission defined age discrimination as
.any act or failure to act, or any law or policy that adversely affects an
184. Although some provision was made for judicial review, the statute, in 1975, contained
no authorization of a private right of action, or pattern and practice suits by the Attorney
General. Id. at §§ 6102, 6103. The House version of the legislation did contain these provi-
sions. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 57, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1324. By striking these provisions, Congress intended that the law be imple-
mented through "a set of consistent Federal regulations rather than on a case by case method
in the courts." Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1324.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 304(a)(5); see also 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 57,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1324. In 1978, the effective date was
changed to July 1, 1979 to provide Congress more time to consider amendments to the existing
statute. See Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-478,
§ 401(b)(2), 92 Stat. 1513, 1555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(5) (1982)).
186. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6106.
187. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 57, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1324.
188. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
STUDY, PART I (1977) [hereinafter STUDY I]. In January 1979, the Commission issued a
second volume describing the study's methodology and summarizing the record of information
obtained about each of the federal programs studied. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, PART 11 (1979) [hereinafter STUDY II].
189. The programs included community mental health centers, legal services, basic voca-
tional rehabilitation services, community health centers, social services to individuals and fam-
ilies (title XX of the Social Security Act), training and public service employment (CETA),
food stamps, Medicaid, state basic vocational education grants, and adult basic education.
STUDY I, supra note 188, at 4-7. The Commission also examined the undergraduate and grad-
uate admission policies at institutions of higher education. Id. at 7-8.
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individual on the basis of age."' 9 ° The study was further guided by the
"principle that administrators of Federally assisted programs have a duty to
take steps to ensure that eligible persons have the opportunity to participate
in all programs regardless of their age."' 91 Given these basic principles, it is,
perhaps, not surprising that the study found that age discrimination was
"widespread" and "[p]ersons aged 65 or over [were] consistently adversely
affected."' 92 The study made no effort to apply the statutory definitions as
expressed in the basic prohibition of section 6102 and exceptions of section
6103, nor did it examine the statute's effect on existing federally assisted
programs.
The study showed underrepresentation of the elderly in each program,
based largely upon a methodology that compared program participation
rates for the elderly against their percentage of the total population in the
area served by the program. For example, persons over sixty-five comprised
9.9% of the service area population of all community mental health centers.
That age group, however, represented only 4.1% of the new patients served
by the centers in 1975.'9'
Some underrepresentation was attributed to lack of trained staff or inade-
quate outreach efforts. 194 There were also examples of the explicit use of age
distinctions. The study pointed to some evidence of staff biases against older
people.' 95 For the most part, however, the Commission found that priorities
set by program administrators caused the low participation rates. For exam-
ple, programs to train individuals for employment were targeted toward
younger people who had a better chance of securing employment and who
would be expected to work for a greater number of years.196 Some commu-
nity mental health centers did not expand services or outreach efforts for the
elderly because they considered the probability of successfully treating older
persons less than it was for younger patients.'
9 7
Of the 114 medical schools surveyed, twenty-eight schools specified age
restrictions as part of their selection process.' 98 Among the explanations
190. STUDY I, supra note 188, at 3.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 3. The study found that other age groups were adversely affected in some pro-
grams. For example, children under 15 were underserved by the community mental health
centers program. Id. at 11. However, persons over 65 were found to be the "most frequently
affected age group." Id. at 10. The study noted that generally "the older an individual, the
more likely he or she will be the victim of age discrimination." Id.
193. Id. at 11.
194. Id. at 52-56, 74-76.
195. Id. at 71-74.
196. Id. at 30-33, 61-66, 68-69.
197. STUDY II, supra note 188, at 93-95.
198. STUDY II, supra note 188, at 181.
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given by the Association of American Medical Colleges was that medical
school requires seven to ten years of expensive training. Thus, "the invest-
ment by society in educating physicians is so great that the proportional
reduction in practicing years makes older candidates a less worthwhile socie-
tal investment."' 99 The study reported one extreme example of a state
Medicaid program which "routinely" denied prior approval for nonemer-
gency surgery to older persons on the grounds that the "investments would
not be cost effective for the [s]tate" because the surgery would not be ex-
pected to result in an increase in taxable income or a decrease in welfare
payments. 2°
Thus, where resources were limited, program administrators often
targeted their services to younger persons in an effort to "provide society
with the greatest return on its investment."' '2 The Civil Rights Commission
condemned this cost-benefit rationale as inconsistent with the "concept of
the dignity and worth of the individual.
'20 2
The major recommendation of the report was, perhaps, compelled by the
broad definition of age discrimination used by the Commission. The report
recommended amending the statute to prohibit the use of age as a criterion
for eligibility in federally assisted programs except where specifically author-
ized by federal legislation or where "taken to overcome the effects of condi-
tions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular
age."20 3 The Commission felt that neither state legislators nor federal, state,
or local program administrators should be permitted to introduce age dis-
tinctions where not authorized by federal statute.2°
The Commission theorized that it is never reasonable to utilize age as a
criterion for allocating benefits under federally assisted programs because
other criteria are available by which to evaluate "the relative needs of indi-
viduals., 2 5 Although it might be more administratively convenient to use
age as a proxy for those other criteria, in the Commission's view that alone
would not justify the exclusion of individuals based upon generalizations
about age.206
In early 1978, the House subcommittee held hearings on the Commis-
199. Id. at 190 (quoting Hearing Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 12 (Washing-
ton, D.C., Sept. 26-28, 1977) (statement of Dr. J. Sherman, Ass'n of American Medical
Colleges)).
200. Id. at 265-68.
201. STUDY I, supra note 188, at 79.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 88.
204. Id. at 85-86.
205. Id. at 83.
206. Id.
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sion's report.2 ° 7 Dr. Flemming, the first witness, presented the Commis-
sion's report and urged adoption of its recommendations.2 "8 After the
conclusion of Dr. Flemming's prepared testimony, Representative Jeffords
posed a question: "Would it be improper ... to utilize as professional crite-
ria the worth of the individual to society based upon the likely life of that
person?" Dr. Flemming responded that he did not believe "that we have the
competence to sit in judgment of our fellow human beings in that particular
manner."
20 9
After further hearings, the House committee reported, and the House
passed, a bill reauthorizing the Older Americans Act. The bill would have
implemented the Commission's major recommendation by making two
amendments to the ADA: (1) deleting the term "unreasonable" from the
statutory statement of purpose, and (2) severely narrowing the exceptions
contained in section 6103 to permit the use of age as a program criterion
only when authorized by federal statute or undertaken to overcome the ef-
fects of conditions limiting past participation.210
The Senate had already passed a bill reauthorizing the Older Americans
Act without any amendments to the ADA. 21" Although the Senate had in-
sisted on the Commission study, it never held hearings after the study was
completed. The earlier questions about the need for the legislation appeared
to have evaporated.21 2 Indeed, only the Administration seemed concerned
about the Commission's report and recommendations. Although adminis-
trations had changed since passage of the original legislation, the opposition
of the executive branch continued.21 3
207. Oversight on the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and Extension of the Older Americans
Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings]. A number of wit-
nesses testified in favor of the ADA and the Commission's recommendations, but none offered
further evidence of age discrimination or of a need to amend the statute. See, e.g., id. at 193-
225 (testimony of Jack Ossofsky, Executive Director of the National Council on the Aging); id.
at 420-37 (testimony of Robert J. Ahrens, President of the Urban Elderly Coalition); id. at
556-88 (testimony of Rep. Claude Pepper).
208. Id. at 2-25 (testimony of Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights).
209. Id. at 23 (testimony of Rep. James Jeffords).
210. H.R. 12,255, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1978); see H.R. REP. No. 1150, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 40 (1978).
211. S. 2850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.; see S. REP. No. 855, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
212. In introducing the House hearings, Rep. Brademas, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Select Education, stated that the ADA had been "enacted in response to evidence of perva-
sive and unconscionable age discrimination in our society." 1978 Hearings, supra note 207, at
1.
213. As required by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 6106(e), the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) prepared a response to the Commission's study, and the response was submit-
ted to the White House and congressional committees. It was critical of the Commission's
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After the bills had been sent to conference, the Administration took steps
to defeat the provision in the House bill that would have narrowed the sec-
tion 6103 exceptions. Then HEW Secretary Joseph Califano wrote to the
conferees expressing opposition to any change in the exceptions and
exclusions.21 4
For a second time, a conference considering the ADA produced a strange
"compromise." The term "unreasonable" was deleted from the statement of
purpose, but the amendment to section 6103 was dropped. Whatever pur-
pose the conferees may have had in striking the term "unreasonable" from
the statement of purpose, that amendment effected no substantive change in
the statute.21 5 Clearly, Congress had rejected the Commission's definition of
prohibited discrimination. Although the Commission sought to prohibit all
age distinctions with an adverse effect, that could have been accomplished
only by amending the substantive standards of section 6102 and section
6103.216
"assumptions and methodology" and opposed any change in existing exceptions to the ADA.
Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discriminat ion Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J.
27, 55-56 (1979).
214. Letter from Secretary Califano to conferees on Older Americans Act amendments
(Sept. 12, 1978), quoted in Schuck, supra note 207, at 57 n.159. For a discussion of the Admin-
istration's role in the defeat of the House amendment, see id. at 55-57.
215. At most, the amendment can be read as an affirmation that the statutory exceptions
should not be governed by a "reasonableness" test. Representative Claude D. Pepper ex-
plained his understanding of the amendment:
The present exemptions are retained, but I believe that the deletion of the word "un-
reasonable" from the act's statement of purpose gives a good indication of how Con-
gress intends the existing exemptions to be interpreted. The ADA must be viewed as
a civil rights statute. As such, exceptions to it must be narrowly construed. I am
particularly concerned with certain excuses for not serving older people put forward
by program managers interviewed by the Civil Rights Commission in preparing its
report. They include the so-called cost-effectiveness argument, which asserts that,
since it is often more expensive to reach older clients, a program could reasonably
conclude that it could concentrate on younger persons. Other managers argue that
the existence of age-specific programs, such as the community service employment
program for older Americans, justifies other, more general programs, such as those
funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, ignoring the needs
of older applicants.
Mr. Speaker, these excuses are nothing more than that. The deletion of the word
["unreasonable"] from the statement of purpose makes that clear. Such practices are
discriminatory. They will be prohibited under the new amendments.
124 CONG. REC. 33,487 (1978).
216. The only other significant amendment made in 1978 involved private actions to en-
force the ADA. A private right of action had been provided in the House version of the 1975
legislation. Section 307 of H.R. 3922 provided that any aggrieved person could obtain judicial
review pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. That provision had been struck in
conference and the legislation which passed provided that agency fund terminations and
"other means authorized by law" were to be the exclusive means of enforcement. 1975 CON-
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C. The Intent of Congress
Although the legislative history of the 1975 Act and the 1978 Amend-
ments is largely ambiguous and uninformative, certain conclusions can be
drawn. First, Congress believed that the problem of age discrimination in
federally assisted programs was sufficient to warrant a remedy. The factual
basis for the enactment of age discrimination legislation can be found in two
sources: the Civil Rights Commission report and the legislative history of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Despite some initial skepticism about the need for legislation, the ADA
never faced any real congressional opposition. Although the purpose of the
Civil Rights Commission study was to explore the need for a statute barring
age discrimination, when Congress reviewed the findings of the study in
1978, no effort was made to repeal the statute. Thus, it is logical to assume
that Congress considered the evidence of discrimination revealed by the
study sufficient to demonstrate that a statutory remedy was needed. The
Commission's findings, however, were influenced by its sweeping definition
of age discrimination,217 a definition Congress clearly rejected when it de-
clined to adopt the Commission's proposed amendment to the statutory ex-
ceptions in section 6103.
What then was the discrimination that Congress was trying to prohibit?
The answer is far from clear. Perhaps it was not politically feasible for Con-
gress, having passed a prohibition on age discrimination, to repeal that legis-
lation and, thereby, appear to favor such discrimination.
There is, however, another answer to this seeming contradiction. Con-
gress may have been impressed by the Commission's factual findings without
being willing to adopt its legal conclusions. Although Congress was not
ready to join the Commission in characterizing all age distinctions with an
adverse effect on the elderly as unlawful discrimination, the Commission
provided a factual basis for concluding that the elderly had been the victims
of intentional discrimination.
The Commission report contained some evidence that older individuals
were being excluded from important education and training opportunities
and that their medical needs were being overlooked.21 Moreover, these re-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 53, 55, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1320, 1321.
In 1978, the House bill provided a private action by striking the section limiting remedies.
H.R. REP. No. 1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 125 (1978). It also provided for the award of
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Id. The House provisions were retained in
conference and became § 6104(e) of the amended ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (1982).
217. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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suits were attributed to a widespread attitude that program resources should
be targeted toward younger individuals because providing services to the eld-
erly would bring the lowest return on the government's investment.
2 19
Members of Congress may have differed on the reasonableness of the justifi-
cations given for this kind of priority setting. The failure of Congress to
repeal the statute, however, must be read as indicating an intent to prohibit
at least some of the conduct identified by the Commission study..
Moreover, the House committee report's reference220 to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA)22 1 was significant. In 1965, the Secre-
tary of Labor reported to Congress that despite "basic research in the field of
aging [establishing] that there is a wide range of individual physical ability
regardless of age,"' 222 there "is persistent and widespread use of age limits in
hiring." 223 The report concluded "that in a great many cases [the use of age
limits] can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older work-
ers on the basis of age and regardless of ability. ' 224 Age discrimination was
based largely upon "stereotypes unsupported by objective fact" and rarely
upon the sort of animus motivating racial discrimination. 225 Such discrimi-
nation was found to be pervasive, affecting hundreds of thousands of
workers.2 26
Further study of the problem by Congress confirmed the Secretary's find-
ings. 227 In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA228 "to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment" against workers age forty through sixty-
five229 and "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability
219. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
220. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975).
221. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
222. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 9 (1965); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION (EEOC), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
26 (1981).
223. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, supra note 222, at 21; EEOC, supra note 222,
at 37.
224. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, supra note 222, at 21; EEOC, supra note 222,
at 37; see also 113 CONG. REC. 31,256-57 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Young); Age Discrimination
in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967).
225. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983).
226. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2213-14 (quoting President Johnson's message of Jan. 23, 1967).
227. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
228. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was
amended in 1978 to protect individuals aged 40 through 69. Id. § 631(a).
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rather than age."'23 ° This evidence apparently convinced Congress of a need
for further legislation to prevent discrimination in all federally assisted
programs.
Second, although the ADA was intended to protect all age groups,
2 3'
Congress was primarily concerned with prohibiting discrimination against
older individuals.23 2 The reports and debates repeatedly refer to discrimina-
tion against the elderly.2 33 There is virtually no mention of other age
groups. The ADEA protects only those above the age of forty. Even the
Commission report includes few examples of unfair treatment of other age
groups.23 4
Third, Congress did not generally condemn the use of age distinctions in
the ADA. A sweeping provision exempts all age distinctions authorized by
law.235 Indeed, Congress' real difficulty was in drawing a line between the
impermissible and the permissible. Nevertheless, there are certain indica-
tions of what it considered impermissible.
By modeling the ADA after the ADEA, Congress sought to prohibit in
federally assisted programs the same kind of discrimination prohibited under
the ADEA. The ADEA was passed to prevent the unnecessary use of un-
tested generalizations about older individuals to deny them employment op-
portunities. By citing the evil identified in the ADEA,2 36 Congress
emphasized its intent to prohibit the same evil from depriving older persons
of important benefits under federally assisted programs. And Congress
sought to accomplish that result in the same way-by applying a standard to
test the accuracy and necessity of using age-based generalizations. Thus, it
modeled the primary "normal operation" and "statutory objective" excep-
tions of the ADA after a similar provision in the ADEA.23 7
Given this purpose, it seems equally clear that Congress wished to prevent
the establishment of maximum age limits for participation in federally as-
sisted programs when those limits were based upon an assessment of the
"social worth" of older individuals. The rationale that older persons should
230. Id. § 621(b) (statement of findings and purpose).
231. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975).
232. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,771-88 (1979) (HEW regulations).
233. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 9212
(1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
234. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Commission report did not even demonstrate
that children were participating in the federal programs it examined at a lower rate than
adults. See Teitlebaum, The Age Discrimination Act and Youth, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 969,
984-91 (1983).
235. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 219-30 and accompanying text.
237. See text accompanying infra note 259.
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be excluded from programs because they will live fewer years and, therefore,
provide society a lower return on its investment was condemned specifically
in the 1975 House report, 238 as well as the Commission report2 39 and Dr.
Flemming's testimony.
24°
Even more important, this longevity rationale, if taken to its logical con-
clusion, would threaten to undermine the very intent of the statute. The
conclusion that older individuals are likely to live fewer years is a valid gen-
eralization. The statute does not condemn it because it is irrational, but
because it could be used to justify any maximum age limit for participation
in a federally assisted program. It seems unlikely that Congress would seek
to prohibit untested generalizations about the elderly and, yet, permit this
longevity rationale to survive.
The ADA was part of the Older Americans Act, a statute providing a
wide variety of benefits to the elderly. 241 The very existence of this and simi-
lar statutes and government programs belies the notion that Congress would
have been willing to accept the conclusion that the elderly have a diminished
social value.
Fourth, Congress avoided the difficult definitional issues, choosing instead
to vest considerable discretion in HEW and other federal agencies to define
the prohibited conduct as it applied to their particular programs. Aside
from identifying congressional concern with the uses of age distinctions de-
scribed above, the legislative history is not revealing. Ultimately, the scope
of the ADA will be judged by the statutory language and its administrative
interpretation.
D. The HEW Regulations
In June 1979, HEW issued general, governmentwide regulations 242 that
were to serve as the model for all other agency regulations, as called for by
section 6103 of the ADA. The HEW regulations had the force and effect of
law, giving effect to the statutory prohibition of section 6102.243 Section
238. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
242. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (1979).
243. Section 6102 provides:
Pursuant to regulations prescribed under section 6103 of this title, and except as
provided by section 6103(b) and section 6103(c) of this title, no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982) (emphasis added).
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6103 directed HEW to promulgate general, governmentwide regulations "to
carry out the provisions of section 6102. ' ' 2" Thereafter, each agency that
extended federal financial assistance was to issue regulations governing its
own programs. Those regulations were to be consistent with the general
HEW regulations and would not become effective without the approval of
the Secretary of HEW.24 5
The legislative history indicates that Congress considered these regula-
tions central to the statutory scheme.246 Federal departments and agencies,
under the leadership of HEW, were to provide definition to the statutory
standards. Against that background, it is likely that a court would uphold
244. Section 6103(a) reads, in part:
(1) Not later than one year after the transmission of the report required by sec-
tion 6106(b) of this title, or two and one-half years after November 28, 1975, which-
ever occurs first, the Secretary [of Health and Human Services (then Health,
Education and Welfare)] shall publish in the Federal Register proposed general regu-
lations to carry out the provisions of section 6102 of this title.
(2) (A) The Secretary shall not publish such proposed general regulations until
the expiration of a period comprised of-
(i) the forty-five day period specified in section 6106(e) of this title, and
(ii) an additional forty-five day period, immediately following the period de-
scribed in clause (i), during which any committee of the Congress having jurisdiction
over the subject matter involved may conduct hearings with respect to the report
which the Commission is required to transmit under section 6106(d) of this title, and
with respect to the comments and recommendations submitted by Federal depart-
ments and agencies under section 6106(e) of this title.
(B) The forty-five day period specified in subparagraph (A)(ii) shall include
only days during which both Houses of the Congress are in session.
(3) Not later than ninety days after the Secretary publishes proposed regulations
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register final general
regulations to carry out the provisions of section 6102 of this title, after taking into
consideration any comments received by the Secretary with respect to the regulations
proposed under paragraph (1).
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no regulations issued pur-
suant to this section shall be effective before July 1, 1979.
42 U.S.C. § 6103.
245. Section 6103(a)(4) provides:
(4) Not later than ninety days after the Secretary publishes final general regula-
tions under paragraph (a)(3), the head of each Federal department or agency which
extends Federal financial assistance to any program or activity by way of grant, enti-
tlement, loan; or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, shall trans-
mit to the Secretary and publish in the Federal Register proposed regulations to
carry out the provisions of section 6102 of this title and to provide appropriate inves-
tigative, conciliation, and enforcement procedures. Such regulations shall be consis-
tent with the final general regulations issued by the Secretary, and shall not become
effective until approved by the Secretary.
42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4).
246. 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 57, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1324.
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the regulations, enforcing them absent a clear inconsistency with the lan-
guage or manifest intent of the statute.247
The use of an age test to exclude an individual from a federally assisted
program can be upheld only if it comes within one of the statutory excep-
tions or exemptions of section 6103. Of the five exceptions and exemptions,
this Article will focus on the one most relevant to rationing medical care-
the normal operation exception. Before turning to that exception, however,
a brief discussion of another provision-the "any law" exemption-is
appropriate.
E. The "Any Law" Exemption
Section 6103(b)(2) of the ADA provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any program or
activity established under authority of any law which (A) provides
any benefits or assistance to persons based upon the age of such
persons; or (B) establishes criteria for participation in age-related
terms or describes intended beneficiaries or target groups in such
terms.248
An age distinction which qualifies under this provision is automatically ex-
empt and not subject to further testing under the other statutory
exceptions. 249
247. See, e.g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156,
169 (1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-06 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416 (1977); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1981);
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982).
Great care was taken in formulating the original HEW regulations. In addition to the usual
steps of notice and comment prior to the issuance of regulations, HEW went to considerable
lengths to obtain the views of those who might be knowledgeable about the effect the proposed
regulations would have on federal programs. It created an interagency task force composed of
members from all federal agencies which administer programs of federal financial assistance,
distributed more than 16,000 copies of the proposed rules to members of Congress, state gover-
nors, administrators of federally assisted programs, recipients of federal funds at the state and
local levels and other interested individuals and groups, and held extensive public hearings
around the country. 44 Fed. Reg. at 33,768-69 (1979).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
249. The language would seem to exempt any program or activity established under au-
thority of any law which employs an age distinction. This provision cannot be interpreted
literally without producing anomalous results. For example, a statute may provide grants for
adult education programs for those over age 18. Under a literal construction, any program
administered pursuant to such a grant could use other age distinctions in its program (like
excluding all individuals over the age of 50) and its action would not be subject to the ADA
because it is part of a program or activity established under authority of a law which provides
benefits on the basis of age. Obviously, Congress intended to approve only those age distinc-
tions which were authorized by law. The HEW general regulations correctly adopted the
latter construction. 45 C.F.R. § 90.3(b)(1) (1987).
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It is clear that Congress wished to exempt age distinctions contained in
federal statutes.25 In interpreting the meaning of "any law," there are two
further questions: 1) Does the exemption apply to regulations as well as
statutes; and 2) Does the exemption embrace state and local law? The legis-
lative history provides virtually no guidance on these crucial issues.251
HEW, in its general regulations, considered the several possible interpre-
tations and concluded that "any law" did not cover regulations, but that it
did incorporate state and local laws. "Law," according to the regulations
meant "statute or ordinance adopted by an elected, general purpose legisla-
tive body., 25 2 HEW chose a reasonable interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history, although it certainly was not the only possible
interpretation.253
The regulations explained that inclusion of state and local laws within the
exception "recognizes the authority of State and general purpose, elected
local governments to enact statutes which condition benefits or participation
on the basis of age. ' 254 Thus, HEW concluded that just as Congress must
have the discretion to draw age distinctions, so must other legislative bodies.
The agency chose a very practical approach. Pursuant to its police power,
a state or locality may set a minimum age for drinking, obtaining a driver's
license, or owning a firearm. It may make age distinctions in its penal stat-
utes, athletic programs, and recreational activities. Additionally, it may
grant special tax relief or transportation discounts to the elderly. These dis-
tinctions are commonplace and generally noncontroversial. There is no rea-
son to believe that Congress sought to disturb the numerous state and local
laws which incorporate age distinctions.255 Certainly, nothing in the legisla-
tive history even remotely indicates an intent to reach these laws.
250. The 1975 Conference Report explained the addition of clause (B) which extends the
exemption to the use of "age-related terms." The report noted that the House bill, without
clause (B), limited the exclusion of "programs for which the law provides benefits to persons
based on such person's age, such as with Social Security." 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 149, at 58, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1325.
251. To the extent that the legislative history is at all helpful, it indicates that "any law"
was not meant to include regulations. The 1975 Conference Report stated that the conferees
had "basic differences on the extent to which age may validly be taken into account by pro-
gram administrators in determining who is eligible to participate in programs, in the absence of
statutorily-established criteria regarding age." 1975 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 149, at
56, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1325 (emphasis added); see also 121
CONG. REC. 37,299 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) (ADA "does not apply to reasonable and
necessary distinctions based upon age, or to distinctions which are made pursuant to statute or
necessary to the achievement of a statutory objective.").
252. 45 C.F.R. § 90.3(b)(1) (1987).
253. See Schuck, supra note 213, at 58-63.
254. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,772 (1979).
255. Of course, even if they were not excluded, these age distinctions could be reached
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At the same time, this exemption sweeps broadly. Its scope is not limited
to the noncontroversial or benign uses of age distinctions. It would have
been unthinkable to include such an exemption in title VI or the other stat-
utes barring discrimination in federally assisted programs. To do so would
have permitted the very discrimination which the statutes were designed to
prohibit.
HEW, however, provided a basis for drawing a distinction between the
ADA and those statutes. Although the other statutes were largely directed
at discrimination by states and localities, HEW found no "clear indication
that age discrimination occurs as a result of State and local statutes.
' 256
This conclusion seems questionable. There had been examples of states
and localities discriminating against older individuals in employment. In-
deed, the ADEA was amended in 1974 to cover state and local governmental
entities for just that reason.2 57 Nevertheless, it was reasonable for HEW to
exclude states and localities without some clear expression by Congress that
it intended to cover them.
The "any law" exemption is quite significant for two reasons. It narrows
the scope of the statute considerably. But it also moderates the impact of the
statutory prohibition and exemptions. If any age distinction is struck down,
it can be validated by the passage of federal, state, or local legislation. If a
legislative body makes a policy choice to permit an age distinction in a given
program, the ADA will not be a barrier. Clearly, this should alleviate some
concern about an overly strict application of the statute.
The "any law" exemption reveals Congress' ambivalence about the use of
age distinctions. It is difficult to understand how an age distinction can be
discriminatory when adopted by program administrators and not discrimi-
natory when enacted by legislators. Perhaps the rationale for accepting leg-
islative use of age distinctions, while subjecting others to scrutiny, is found in
the process by which an age distinction is adopted. The legislative use of an
age distinction authorized by this exemption is always explicit, open to pub-
lic scrutiny, and often adopted only after public debate. In contrast, when
an age distinction is adopted by a program administrator, the potential bene-
ficiary of the program may not even know that he or she was excluded be-
cause of age. Nor does public scrutiny necessarily precede the adoption of
any age test by a federally assisted program. While public scrutiny does not
under the ADA only insofar as they were applied by a program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. See infra text accompanying notes 332, 334.
256. Id.
257. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(1)-(4), 88
Stat. 55, 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)); see also EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 233 (1983).
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eliminate the possibility that age will be used in an arbitrary manner, it does
provide some protection. Congress apparently did not consider age discrimi-
nation so pervasive that the majoritarian process could not be trusted to
protect the minority's rights.
F The Normal Operation Exception
A federally assisted program may use age as a criterion for participation,
even though such action would otherwise violate the basic statutory prohibi-
tion of the ADA, if that action "reasonably takes into account age as a factor
necessary to the normal operation or the achievement of any statutory objec-
tive of such program or activity."25 This exception is governed by a stan-
dard of "reasonable necessity."
1. The ADA's Normal Operation Exception is Analogous to the ADEA's
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception
The language of the normal operation exception in the ADA is very simi-
lar to an exception found in the ADEA. The ADEA prohibits employment
practices that discriminate, on the basis of age, against individuals between
258. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A). The "statutory objective" language of this provision ap-
plies only to uses of age in programs conducted pursuant to statute, while the normal opera-
tion language also applies to Federally assisted programs that do not operate pursuant to
federal statute, such as private medical schools. Statutory programs may be able to rely on the
normal operation exception, but only to the extent that the program's normal operation is not
inconsistent with its statutory objective.
Congress added the statutory objective language in conference, in 1975, without any expla-
nation of its meaning, except for a brief remark by Representative Quie. See supra note 180.
Presumably, Congress recognized that programs conducted pursuant to statute must be gov-
erned by the objectives of that statute and the use of age should be evaluated in terms of those
objectives.
The HEW general regulations apply the same four-part test to both the normal operation
and statutory objective exceptions. 45 C.F.R. § 90.13 (1987). This seems reasonable in light of
the statutory context. Both exceptions are modified by the same language ("such action rea-
sonably takes into account age as a factor necessary"), which provides the basis for the stan-
dard. Professor Schuck would apply a different standard to the statutory objective exception,
largely on the basis of "unofficial" legislative history and Representative Quie's remarks. See
Schuck, supra note 213, at 73-76. The HEW regulations seem reasonable enough to withstand
challenge.
The regulations are more vulnerable, however, in defining statutory objectives to include
only a purpose "expressly stated in" a federal, state or local statute. While this is a reasonable
requirement for the "any law" exemption, it is not for the statutory objective exception. Often
statutes have implicit objectives, revealed only in the legislative history or inferred from the
statutory scheme. These purposes should be given weight in deciding whether a particular use
of age is necessary to achieve a statutory objective. For purposes of this article, reference to the
normal operation exception encompasses the statutory objective exception as well.
1036 [Vol. 37:993
ADA and Hidden Rationing of Medical Care
the ages of forty and sixty-nine. 2 9 The ADEA creates an exception, how-
ever, permitting an employer to utilize age as an employment criterion when
age constitutes a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business" (BFOQ).
26 °
The ADEA's BFOQ provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell.2 6 1 Western Air Lines had a rule requir-
ing retirement of flight engineers at age sixty, which it sought to justify as
necessary to the safe operation of its aircraft.2 62
The medical testimony in the case was conflicting. Western's expert wit-
ness testified that "with advancing age the likelihood of onset of disease in-
creases and that in persons over age 60 it could not be predicted whether and
when such diseases would occur." 263 At the same time, plaintiffs' experts
testified that "physiological deterioration is caused by disease, not aging, and
that 'it was feasible to determine on the basis of individual medical examina-
tions whether flight deck crew members, including those over age 60, were
259. The basic prohibition against discriminatory employment practices is found in 29
U.S.C. § 623 (1982). Section 623(a) declares it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Id. § 623(a). There are also provisions respecting the activities of employment agencies and
labor organizations. Id. § 623(b)-(c). These provisions are similar to § 703 of title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception of
the ADEA was modeled after the BFOQ exception of title VII which permits classifications
based on religion, sex, or national origin "where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l).
261. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
262. Id. at 403. For certain commercial flights, Western requires three crew members in
the cockpit: a captain, a first officer or co-pilot and a flight engineer. The flight engineer does
not operate the flight controls unless the captain and first officer become incapacitated. Id.
A regulation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prohibits any person over the
age of 60 from serving as a pilot or first officer on a commercial flight. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c)
(1988). The FAA rule has been justified on the theory that "incapacitating medical events"
and "adverse psychological, emotional, and physical changes" occur as a consequence of ag-
ing. "The inability to detect or predict with precision an individual's risk of sudden or subtle
incapacitation, in the face of known age-related risks, counsels against relaxation of the rule."
49 Fed. Reg. 14,695 (1984). The FAA has specifically refused to establish a mandatory retire-
ment age for flight engineers. 49 Fed. Reg. 14,694 (1984).
263. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 406 (quoting Criswell v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
384, 390 (C.D. Cal. 1981)).
1988] 1037
Catholic University Law Review
physically qualified to continue to fly.' 26 Western contended that such
medical disputes were inevitable, and juries should not be "permitted 'to
resolve bona fide conflicts among medical experts respecting the adequacy of
individualized testing.' ,265 Therefore, Western argued, its determination of
safety requirements should be accepted so long as it was supported by rea-
266sonable expert opinion.
The Court squarely rejected Western's argument, emphasizing that rea-
sonable necessity, not reasonableness, was the standard Congress had
adopted for the BFOQ exception.2 67 According to the Court, a rule requir-
ing deference to the employer's expert "would allow some employers to give
free reign to the stereotype of older workers that Congress decried in the
legislative history of the ADEA.
' 268
The Court noted that the purpose of the ADEA was "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age.",2 6 9 Moreover,
generalizations about the "psychological and physiological degeneration"
caused by aging had been rejected by Congress, in favor of an individualized
determination of ability.270 The BFOQ provision was a limited exception to
that general understanding, created because Congress recognized that age
requirements "may sometimes serve as a necessary proxy for neutral em-
ployment qualifications essential to the employer's business."'2 7' Given the
purposes of the ADEA, however, the Court ruled that the BFOQ exception
should be construed narrowly.27 2
In Criswell, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part test first articulated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours. 273 First, an employment classification based on age
falls within the bona fide occupational qualification exception only where it
serves as a proxy for a job qualification that is " 'reasonably necessary to the
264. Id.
265. Id. at 422 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9 n. 10).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 419. In so doing the Court rejected the test adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). At least in cases involving qualifications
adopted for safety reasons, the Hodgson court had concluded that an employer need demon-
strate only "that it has a reasonable basis in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum
hiring age will increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its passengers." 499 F.2d at 863.
268. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 423.
269. Id. at 410.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 412.
273. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
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essence of [the employer's] business.' ,,274 A job qualification measured by
age is not reasonably necessary if it is "peripheral to the central mission of
the employer's business.1
275
Second, an age classification is "reasonably necessary only when the em-
ployer is compelled to rely on age. ,276 An employer can make such a show-
ing in either of two ways. The employer can establish that it " 'had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all [persons over the age of qualification] would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.' ,,277 Alterna-
tively, the employer can prove that it is " 'impossible or highly impractical'
to deal with older employees on an individualized basis."
278
2. The Four Part Test
HEW regulations set out the elements of the normal operation exception
under the ADA in a four-part test. The test is met if:
(a) Age is used as a measure or approximation of one or more
other characteristics; and
(b) The other characteristic(s) must be measured or approxi-
mated in order for the normal operation of the program or activity
to continue ...; and
(c) The other characteristic(s) can be reasonably measured or
approximated by the use of age; and
(d) The other characteristic(s) are impractical to measure di-
rectly on an individual basis.2 79
"Normal operation" is defined as "the operation of a program or activity
without significant changes that would impair its ability to meet its
objectives. "'28
274. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 236
(5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 414.
277. Id. (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)
(title VII case)).
278. Id. (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)).
The issue before the Court in Criswell was the propriety of the jury instructions, not whether
the standard had been correctly applied, which was a jury question. Nevertheless, the Court
commented on the testimony of Western's experts, finding it outweighed by evidence that
other reputable airlines do not require retirement of flight officers at age 60, that Western itself
relied on individualized testing in similar circumstances, and that the FAA refused to establish
a mandatory retirement age for flight officers. Id. at 423.
279. 45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (1987).
280. Id. § 90.13.
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HEW modeled its interpretation of the normal operation exception on the
ADEA BFOQ exception.28 In all but one respect, the ADA normal opera-
tion standard mirrors that of the ADEA BFOQ exception, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Criswell.
Under both the ADEA. and the ADA regulations, age may be used as an
employment or program criterion if it is used as a measure or approximation
of some other characteristic. Under the normal operation exception, where
age is used as a criterion itself, and not to represent another characteristic,
its use will violate the ADA.282
Under both Criswell and the ADA regulations, the other characteristic
must be "essential"--either to the employer's business or to the normal op-
eration of the federally assisted program. While Criswell specifically used
that term as applied to the ADEA's BFOQ, the ADA regulations imply the
same meaning by finding the exception applicable only if necessary to the
normal operation of the program; that is, the characteristic "must be mea-
sured or approximated" for the program to continue without impairing its
ability to meet its objectives.283
The third prong of the ADA normal operation standard, as set forth in
the HEW regulations, is implicit in the Court's reading of the ADEA in
Criswell- age may be used as a proxy for another characteristic only where
that characteristic can be reasonably measured by the use of age. There
must be a "close relationship" between age and the characteristic being mea-
sured, but the regulations do not require that it be statistically valid.284
The only difference between the Criswell test and the ADA regulations lies
in the standard for determining when individualized evaluation of qualifica-
tions is not required. The fourth prong of the ADA standard requires that
the other characteristic be "impractical" to measure directly on an individ-
281. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,781 (1979) (an analysis of comments on HEW final rule). The
guidelines adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for implementation of
the ADEA state the test somewhat differently:
(b) An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the
age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all
or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified,
or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that can-
not be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer's objective in asserting
a BFOQ is public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice does
indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would
better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1987).
282. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,782 (1979). Where age is not measuring another characteris-
tic, its use is wholly arbitrary.
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Id.
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ual basis. Criswell allows the use of an age criterion only where it is "impos-
sible or highly impractical" to insure by individual testing that an employee
will have the necessary job qualifications.285 The difference in the language
of the fourth prong of the test appears to indicate a more relaxed standard
under the ADA. The ADA regulations, however, do not explain why differ-
ent language was chosen, although the choice was not inadvertent. Com-
mentators suggested substitution of the word "impossible," but HEW did
not adopt that more stringent standard.286 While the difference in language
might indicate that the costs or administrative inconvenience of individual-
ized evaluations would be given greater weight under the ADA than under
the ADEA, such an interpretation is not made explicit.287
3. Cost-Benefit Considerations
Another important issue, essentially left unresolved in the ADA regula-
tions is the extent to which cost benefit considerations may justify targeting
programs by use of age distinctions. All programs have limited funding, and
administrators may need to limit the availability of the services provided.
There are several different ways in which a program might respond to cost-
benefit considerations. Program administrators might target services to
those who are most likely to benefit, to those who are least costly to serve, to
those most in need, or to those who will produce the greatest return on the
program's investment by utilizing the education or training best or for the
longest period of time. Any of these targeting approaches might use age as a
criterion.
285. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985). In addition to the
circumstances already mentioned, the ADEA, as interpreted in Criswell, permits the use of an
age qualification for employment where the employer can establish "a reasonable basis for
believing that all or substantially all employees above [that] age lack the qualifications required
for the position." Although the ADA regulations do not explicitly permit the use of an age
cut-off under these circumstances, it is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory requirement
and appears consistent with the regulations' interpretation of the ADA. Presumably, the em-
phasis here is on "all or substantially all." Thus, the employer or program must be able to
establish that individualized determinations are unnecessary because there are so few over or
under the designated age who would qualify.
286. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,782 (1979).
287. The preamble to the regulations rejects a program's refusal to make changes in pro-
gram operation "because those changes disturb administrative routine or are inconvenient."
44 Fed. Reg. 33,773 (1979). Section 90.14(d) of the proposed regulations permitted the use of
age to measure another characteristic where that characteristic was "difficult, costly, or other-
wise impractical to measure directly." When the final regulations were published, the refer-
ences to cost and difficulty of measurement were deleted. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,782 (1979). Because
it will always be more convenient and often less costly to use an age test, the mere fact of added
cost or difficulty alone should not justify the use of an age distinction. Such a limitation seems
essential to maintaining the integrity of the statute. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
At the same time, cost and difficulty should not be considered irrelevant. See infra note 322.
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The ADA regulations neither condone nor prohibit the use of a cost-bene-
fit analysis in the administration of federally assisted programs. 288 Instead,
the regulations declare that any age test will have to meet the four-part nor-
mal operation standard and "cannot be disqualified or justified because it
reflects a cost-benefit consideration." '289 The regulations also state that the
four-part test will operate to screen out "discriminatory" cost-benefit consid-
erations. Therefore, a key question involves the criteria applied to distin-
guish between discriminatory and permissible cost benefit considerations.
The regulations avoid a complete answer to this question.
4. An Inadequate Test
Given the similarity in statutory language of the normal operation and
BFOQ exceptions, as well as the legislative history linking the ADA and the
ADEA, it was reasonable for HEW, the agency charged with writing and
implementing the regulations, to pattern the standard for the normal opera-
tion exception after the test for a BFOQ.29 ° At the same time, there were
reasons to be wary of a wholesale adoption of the BFOQ standard.
288. The legislative history is generally inconclusive on this point. Only Representatives
Quie and Pepper addressed the issue and they took opposing positions. It may be possible,
however, to reconcile their positions. They seemed to be discussing two different cost-benefit
rationales. Representative Quie referred to a program that cannot reach all students and,
therefore, chooses those who, presumably, are most likely to benefit. See supra note 180. In
contrast, Representative Pepper attacked a "cost-effectiveness" rationale that would exclude
older individuals because they are more costly to serve. See supra note 215.
289. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1979).
290. The statement of purpose in the original ADA declared the intent of the Act to pro-
hibit only "unreasonable" age discrimination and the 1975 Conference Report stated that the
exceptions should be "modified by considerations of reasonableness." See supra note 176 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the normal operation exception does not incorporate a rea-
sonableness standard. As noted above, the statement of purpose did not modify the language
of the exceptions. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The language of the normal
operation exception incorporates a more rigorous standard. Age distinctions are permitted
only if they reasonably take age into account as a factor necessary to the normal operation of
the program. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1982). In contrast, the exception for nonage factors
which have a disproportionate adverse effect on the basis of age does permit the use of such a
factor when it is reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(B). The language of the normal operation
exception must prevail over that of the statement of purpose. A more consistent reading of the
statement of purpose would acknowledge that it simply indicated an intent not to proscribe all
age distinctions, regardless of their rationale.
Moreover, in 1978, the term "unreasonable" was deleted from the statement of purpose.
While this amendment did not effect a substantive change, it did serve to defeat any argument
that the normal operation exception has a reasonableness standard. Indeed, Representative
Pepper considered that to be the effect of the amendment to the statement of purpose. See
supra note 215.
Even though the legislative history did not mention the ADEA BFOQ exception itself as the
basis for the normal operation exception, the legislative history and similar language show that
Congress modeled the ADA after the ADEA. Thus, the statute itself contains a reasonable
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In interpreting the ADA, HEW was faced with the task of formulating a
rule to govern many factually different situations. The ADA involves not
only employment opportunities, but programs that provide benefits of all
degrees of importance to the individual, where denial of access to programs
will have varying consequences. Denying an individual access to an athletic
program does not have the same impact as denying an individual a job.
While the essence of an employer's business is fairly simple to determine, the
normal operation of a government program is a complex matter of compet-
ing concerns, priorities and interests.
HEW chose to modify the ADEA test by relaxing the fourth prong of the
ADA test. A better approach would be to devise a flexible test that would
take account of the context in which an age distinction is being used, while
remaining fully consistent with the identified areas of congressional concern.
5. A Flexible Standard
a. The Rationale for Judging Age Distinctions by a Higher Standard
An age test may unfairly disadvantage a qualified individual who is not
given an opportunity to prove that he or she is qualified. That alone should
not invalidate age as a basis for classification, as most classifications are over-
broad. The question for Congress, in judging age, was whether to treat it as
just another admittedly imperfect classifying device or to subject it to a
stricter test, such as that used for race or sex.
2 9 1
necessity standard. Even if it does not, however, the HEW regulations are a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statutory language.
Nonetheless, the ADA and ADEA are somewhat different. The ADA authorizes action
which "reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary" to a program's normal opera-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1) (emphasis added). The ADEA, in contrast, permits the use of
age as an employment criterion when age is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (emphasis
added). Arguably, this could justify different interpretations of the two provisions. Under the
ADA, "reasonable" modifies the manner in which age is employed, but does not modify "nec-
essary," arguably establishing a higher standard for the use of age. Use of an age criterion
must be necessary to normal operation, not just reasonably necessary, as under the ADEA.
There is no basis, however, for concluding that Congress intended to adopt a higher standard
for the ADA. Both statutory provisions should be interpreted as adopting a test of reasonable
necessity.
291. In 1976, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional test of heightened scrutiny for
classifications based upon age. Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), involved a state
policy mandating retirement of police officers at age 50. The officer who was forced to retire
challenged the rule, arguing that it violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 309-10. The
Court rejected the argument that age classifications, like those involving race or national ori-
gin, should be upheld only if necessary to serve a compelling state interest-the strictest level
of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. The Court stated:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimi-
nation, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the
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There is little doubt that the use of age as a classifying device cannot be
equated with the use of race or even with the use of sex.292 One reason for
close scrutiny of classifications based on race and sex is doubt about the
accuracy of such classifications.2 93 A judgment has been made that such
classifications are rarely, if ever, related to ability. Moreover, there is a natu-
ral suspicion of classifications that disadvantage minorities and women be-
cause history demonstrates that these groups have often been the targets of
discrimination, even by public officials. Therefore, they are in need of spe-
cial protection from the majoritarian process.
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful une-
qual treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.... [O]ld age does not define a
"discrete and insular" group, . . .in need of "extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if
we live out our normal span.
Id. at 313-14 (citation omitted).
The Court held that the lowest level of scrutiny-the rational basis test-should apply. Id.
at 314. The Court presumed the validity of age classifications, requiring only proof that they
were reasonable. Id. Applying that standard, it upheld the mandatory retirement policy.
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more precisely through individual-
ized testing after age 50 is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fitness is
not rationally furthered by a maximum-age limitation. It is only to say that with
regard to the interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not chosen the best
means to accomplish this purpose. But where rationality is the test, a State "does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect.
Id. at 316 (footnote omitted).
The Court reaffirmed what it considered the inherent rationality of drawing distinctions
based upon age in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). There, it characterized as "common-
sense" the notion that "aging-almost by definition-inevitably wears us all down." Id. at
112. Bradley involved a mandatory retirement age of 60 for foreign service officers. Id. at 95.
292. There is a hierarchy of protected groups under both the Constitution and some civil
rights statutes. For purposes of equal protection analysis, classifications based on race, na-
tional origin, and alienage are considered constitutionally suspect and subjected to the strictest
scrutiny. They are upheld only when necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986). Gender classifications, as
well as those based on illegitimacy, are judged by a middle level of scrutiny-whether they are
substantially related to a significant state interest. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982). All other classifications,
including those based on handicap or age, will be approved if found to have a rational basis.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441-43 (1985).
These varying levels of scrutiny are, to some extent, also reflected in the civil rights statutes.
Under the laws protecting equal employment opportunity-title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the ADEA---classifications based on sex, religion,
national origin and age will be upheld if they are bona fide occupational qualifications, while
race cannot be a BFOQ. Title VII prohibits the use of selection criteria based on generaliza-
tions about race without even inquiring into their accuracy.
293. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference
and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1434-35 (1979).
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Another reason for rejecting the legitimacy of classifications based on race
or sex is that their use undermines our notions of individual autonomy.294
The individual has no control over the immutable characteristic on which a
decision is being based. The repeated use of such classifications has a cumu-
lative effect, stigmatizing the members of the group and, ultimately, creating
a discrete disadvantaged class.29 5
Age can easily be distinguished from these other group characteristics.
First, it frequently bears a relationship to qualification or ability. Secondly,
no age group has been subjected to the same history of discrimination as
minorities and women. Indeed, older individuals are an organized and often
powerful political group, and, therefore, less in need of judicial protection.296
At the same time, Congress saw some reason to question the accuracy and
legitimacy of age distinctions. Although the depth of Congress' analysis can
certainly be faulted, Congress did conclude that there was a history of dis-
crimination based on age, with cumulative effects. 297 It noted a willingness
among program administrators to accept stereotypes, without testing indi-
vidual ability, and to see older individuals as less deserving of government
benefits and services.29' For these reasons, Congress enacted a statute
prohibiting program beneficiaries from using age classifications unless rea-
sonably necessary.
b. Distinguishing Among Age Distinctions: Factors to Consider
Despite this statutory stance, there is no reason to believe that Congress
viewed all age distinctions as equally troublesome. Notably, Congress' find-
ings were limited to the use of classifications based on advancing age.29 9 In-
deed, by exempting from statutory coverage all age distinctions "authorized
by law," it indiscriminately approved a whole host of age classifications that
have disabling effects. 3" Most of the disabling legislative uses of age ap-
proved under the exception, however, would seem to involve minimum, not
maximum, age requirements.
In some respects, classifications based upon advancing age do bear some
of the same attributes as those based on race and sex while classifications
involving other age groups do not. Advancing age can be considered immu-
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1435-36.
296. The same, of course, cannot be said of the young.
297. See supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
299. See supra note 232-34 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
19881 1045
Catholic University Law Review
table 30 1 because maximum age requirements have a certain finality which
other age classifications do not. Once an individual has passed the age of
qualification for a job or benefit, it is forever beyond reach. In contrast, the
individual who is too young to qualify for participation in a program faces
only a temporary barrier. That is not to say that a 17-year-old who is too
young to vote is not deprived of an important right on the basis of an immu-
table characteristic. But the impact is mitigated because he or she will "out-
grow" the disqualification. Thus, minimum age requirements are less threat-
ening to our notions of individual autonomy.
Moreover, there is a stigma associated with advancing age. Our society
views aging as a process of physical and mental decline. At some undesig-
nated age, we reach our peak performance and it is all "downhill" from
there. Thus, older persons are stereotyped as being less able and having less
to contribute to society. Certainly, there are disabling stereotypes about
youth but, again, they are only temporary disabilities and do not result in an
undervaluing of the lives of younger individuals.
In contrast, as Dr. Flemming noted, "because older people are viewed as
being less able to find employment or unable to work, they are not provided
services or sought out as program participants. "302 As this remark demon-
strates, distinctions based on advancing age have a cumulative effect on the
elderly. Other age distinctions have a more random impact, sometimes dis-
advantaging one age group and sometimes another. There is no uniform
minimum age requirement.
Moreover, age distinctions that treat children differently from adults are
not based upon unfounded biases. Rather, they are based upon the widely
accepted notion that children are not entitled to the same level of respect for
their individual autonomy as adults.30 3 In part, our willingness to treat chil-
dren differently is based upon the belief that they lack a certain rationality
and maturity necessary to assume adult responsibilities.
Thus, age is generally considered a valid indicator of physical and emo-
301. See Eglit, OfAge and the Constitution, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 859, 907-09 (1981).
Professor Eglit proposes a higher level of constitutional scrutiny for some age distinctions. Id.
at 906.
302. Legislation to Extend the Older Americans Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 1425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 390
(1975).
303. The notion of respect for individual autonomy rests upon an assumption of the exist-
ence of what has been called "moral agency"-the ability to form rational life choices.
Teitlebaum, supra note 234, at 1000. In many areas of the law, however, it is assumed that
children lack moral agency. Thus, they are required to attend school, and they may not freely
marry or enter into contractual relationships. Most important, perhaps, they generally are
required to submit to the authority of their parents.
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tional maturity. 3" For that reason, in distinguishing between children and
adults, we generally accept age as a measure of their needs and abilities. Our
system of classifying children by age for education is a good example of our
acceptance of these principles. When distinguishing among children or be-
tween children and adults, the value of age as an objective criterion would
seem to outweigh the risk that an individual will be misclassified. For exam-
ple, it would be unnecessarily burdensome to evaluate each applicant indi-
vidually to determine whether he or she is sufficiently mature to drive a car.
Does this mean we should interpret the ADA to protect only older per-
sons, much like the ADEA? The answer is no. Regardless of its wisdom,
the ADA applies to all ages. That does not mean, however, that it must be
applied in the same way in all situations.
Instead, the ADA's regulatory four-part test should be applied flexibly, in
light of a number of considerations. Among the relevant factors are: the
nature of the service or benefit provided by the program; the consequences to
the individual of denial of the service or benefit, including whether it is tem-
porary or permanent; and the consequences to the program of an error in
selection of participants. Administrative efficiency and cost-benefit consider-
ations may be given varying weight, depending upon the strength of each of
these factors.
Consideration of these factors may result generally in a two-tiered stan-
dard--one for the elderly and one for other age groups. That is legitimate
because the consequences of excluding an individual because of youth are
often temporary and, therefore, less severe. Where a program designed to
serve adults uses a maximum age limit to bar older individuals from funda-
mental opportunities in employment, health, or housing, the situation most
resembles that which the ADEA, and, by extension, the ADA, was designed
to prohibit. Under such circumstances, a strict application of the four-part
test is appropriate.
By adjusting application of the four-part test on the basis of these articu-
lated factors, the test becomes flexible enough to adjust to the many different
contexts in which the statute applies.3"5 Moreover, this approach does not
304. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,782 (1979).
305. Judicial interpretation of the ADEA provides precedent for such an approach. For
example, in Criswell the Court recognized that more restrictive job qualifications may be ap-
plied when an inaccurate decision implicates safety, and stated that "'[the greater the safety
factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an
accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure [safety].' " West-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985) (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)). Thus, a court may be more concerned about the
adequacy of individualized testing to evaluate the health of an airplane pilot than the health of
one who sits behind a desk.
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risk a general weakening of the four-part test that might permit use of the
most pernicious age distinctions. There is also room for a stricter applica-
tion of the test when an age distinction seriously disadvantages a younger
person. For example, when a child is placed in an inadequate detention fa-
cility because of his or her age, the use of an age test is not simply a tempo-
rary impediment, but a present burden.
Congress could, and should, have done a better job of articulating the
problem and tailoring a remedy. It would have been preferable for Congress
to articulate a flexible standard. If the ADA is to have any meaning, how-
ever, the agencies and courts should take up the challenge to devise a stan-
dard consistent with congressional intent.
30 6
c. How a Flexible Standard Would Work
It generally is agreed that the ADA was enacted primarily to eliminate the
unnecessary use of age distinctions. Each prong of the normal operation
exception is designed to determine whether the use of age in a given program
is reasonably necessary, and therefore, each prong should be applied flexibly
in light of the factors described above.
The first and second prongs permit the use of age only when necessary to
evaluate a characteristic that must be measured in order for a program's
normal operation to continue. What is necessary for a program's normal
operation is generally a question of fact that is determined by examining the
program's experience, in addition to the experience of other, similar
programs.
The major issue in applying the second prong of the exception is assessing
whether cost-benefit considerations justify targeting program benefits to a
particular age group. Where resources are limited, targeting program bene-
fits to a limited group of beneficiaries may be a legitimate and necessary
program objective. A cost-benefit analysis may be an appropriate means of
deciding how to best target limited resources. However, when a cost-benefit
analysis uses age distinctions to exclude some potential beneficiaries, it must
be examined critically.
As noted above, not all cost-benefit analyses emphasize the same factors.
Whether a particular cost-benefit calculation is permissible depends upon the
nature of the program to which it applies. For each program, targeting
should be accomplished in a manner consistent with other recognized objec-
tives of the program. For example, because the beneficiaries of a program of
306. Unfortunately, this effort may be condemned as administrative and judicial overreach-
ing instead of being seen for what it is-the inevitable result of Congress' failure to perform its
proper role.
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immunization against contagious diseases generally are defined by need, the
program could target its services to those most susceptible to a particular
disease, even if that targeting is done on the basis of age.307
When a statute defines a program's objectives, program administrators
will not find it difficult to determine whether targeting is consistent with the
statutory objectives. Objectives, however, often will not be well-defined. In
those instances, who should decide whether it is appropriate to target serv-
ices to those who will benefit the most, to those most in need, or on some
other basis; or, whether the program should simply provide services on a
first-come, first-served basis? These are policy decisions involving value
judgments that are unsuitable for judicial determination.
This factor tests the program's use of the characteristic that age measures,
not the use of age itself. For that reason, it may be appropriate to afford
program administrators wide discretion in choosing a method of targeting.
The purpose of the ADA is to prevent age discrimination, not to dictate to
program administrators what their objectives should be.3 °8
At the same time, there is more reason to be wary of a cost benefit ration-
ale that serves to disadvantage those of advancing age. Congress clearly was
concerned with the willingness of program administrators to undervalue the
307. The preamble to the HEW regulations approves the use of age to define the benefi-
ciaries of an immunization program. It concludes that age is a reasonable measure of suscepti-
bility and that it is impractical to measure susceptibility on an individual basis. 44 Fed. Reg.
33,774 (1979).
308. Of course, one way of targeting by age is for a program to define its objectives as
serving the needs of a particular age group if that group does, indeed, have distinct needs or
abilities. The preamble to the ADA regulations issued by the HHS uses the example of a Head
Start program which only accepts children over the age of three. 47 Fed. Reg. 57,850, 57,856-
57 (1982). Because the program is highly structured and stresses group activities, it can meet
its objectives only if the children it accepts have reached a certain level of development and
capacity for self-discipline. Id. at 57,857. The preamble concludes that including younger
children who might need more assistance in feeding, changing diapers, and clothes, would
"impair the [program's] ability to meet its objectives." Id.
Similarly, the preamble to the HEW regulations approves the use of a maximum age limit
on membership in a federally assisted youth organization whose purpose it is to provide train-
ing, education, and character development for youth. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,773 (1979). The pream-
ble states that the program is designed to provide training, education, and character building
experiences preparing for the assumption of adult responsibility, that age is highly related to
the need for the services, and that the need cannot be measured on an individualized basis. Id.
The same rationale would justify any school in grouping children in grades by age, reflecting
differences in physical, mental or emotional development. It follows that when an athletic or
enriched science program cannot be offered to all students, school officials may target it to a
particular grade.
Programs that distinguish on the basis of age among children or youths would seem to be of
least concern. The impact of such distinctions is random. Indeed, Representative's Quie's
remarks indicated a willingness to accept such distinctions. See supra note 180.
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lives of older persons.3°9 Where a program designed to provide benefits to
adults seeks to target its limited resources in a way that excludes individuals
over a certain age, it should be viewed with suspicion. For example, defining
a program objective as targeting those who can derive the most benefit may
simply be another way of excluding older individuals because they are per-
ceived to have diminished social value.31° Under these circumstances, a
court should give closer attention to the legitimacy and necessity of the
means of targeting resources.
Indeed, at least one cost-benefit rationale-that based upon the longevity
of the program beneficiary-must be rejected outright. The preamble to the
HEW regulations discusses the example of a medical school that refuses to
admit applicants over the age of thirty-five because it wants to reserve its
limited spaces for those who, upon graduation, will practice medicine for as
long as possible.311 The preamble acknowledges that age may be a reason-
able measure of length of practice and that it is impractical to predict length
of practice on an individualized basis. 31 2 The preamble concludes, however,
that the practice violates the statute because "achieving longevity of practice
for its graduates cannot be considered a program objective for a medical
school within the meaning of the Act.",31 3 Thus, at least in this and similar
instances, a program may not use "broad notions of efficiency or cost-benefit
analysis" to justify exclusion on the basis of age.31 4
While the medical school example purports to analyze this use of age
under the four-part test, in actuality it fails to do so. The regulations reach
the correct conclusion, but it would have been preferable to recognize that
there is another element to the second prong of the normal operation excep-
tion: the program objective identified by the recipient of federal funds as
justifying the use of age must not be one that the ADA has made impermis-
sible.3" 5 Maximizing the longevity of program participants is just such an
309. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
310. It is likely that this concern prompted the HEW regulations to reject targeting re-
sources by age under the Adult Education Act. The purpose of the adult education program is
to "enable all adults to continue their education .. .and .. .enable them to become more
employable, productive, and responsible citizens." 44 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1979). The regula-
tions declare that employability, productivity, and responsibility need not be measured under
this program because its objective is not to "maximize the degree of improvement," but to
improve these characteristics in the individual. Id.
311. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,773 (1979).
312. Id. at 33,774.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. It is disingenuous simply to say that longevity of practice is not a legitimate objective
of a medical school. If it is not legitimate for a medical school, it is difficult to imagine a
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impermissible objective.3 16 Thus, the second prong inquires into the purpose
for which age is employed. If the purpose is illegitimate, the inquiry need
proceed no further.
The third prong of the normal operation exception requires a close rela-
tionship between the use of age and the characteristic measured. The HEW
regulations do not explain the standard for judging whether the relationship
is close, except insofar as they reject the need to show a statistically signifi-
cant relationship.
317
Borrowing from another section of the HEW regulations, it is appropriate
to require that the relationship be "direct and substantial." HEW has estab-
lished that standard to test the connection between "reasonable factors other
than age" that have a disproportionate impact on a particular age group and
the normal operation of a program.318 The standard for judging the use of
explicit age classifications should be at least as rigorous as the test for judg-
ing the use of nonage factors that have a disproportionate impact on an age
group.
program in which it would be a legitimate objective. It is more accurate to simply recognize
that longevity of practice is an objective inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.
316. The rejection of a longevity rationale is consistent with the way some courts have
interpreted the ADEA. In Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the defendant airline's rule denying pilot positions to applicants who were over the
age of 35. United sought to justify its maximum age rule as a safety measure and introduced
evidence showing a higher incidence of medical problems in older pilots. Id. at 306-07. The
court of appeals found, however, that the airline had failed to demonstrate a relationship be-
tween the evidence and the rule establishing a maximum hiring age. Id. at 309. The court
suggested that United's real motive was cost-related. Given the substantial costs of training,
the airline wanted to maximize a pilot's period of peak productivity. Id. at 307. Such cost-
benefit considerations, the court held, cannot be the basis for a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation because "precisely those considerations were among the targets of the Act." Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing Smallwood, rejected a similar
maximum hiring age policy for helicopter pilots in EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d
1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed approval of this interpretation of the ADEA. See
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1983).
Similarly, it is questionable whether targeting to the least costly to employ can be a legiti-
mate objective. The EEOC's ADEA guidelines note that the ADEA prohibits "[a] differentia-
tion based on the average cost of employing older employees as a group." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.7(f) (1987); see also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1987) (Department of Labor guidelines).
Some courts have concluded that although reducing costs is a legitimate business goal, it may
not be accomplished in a manner that singles out older workers. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of
Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); Leftwich, 702 F.2d
at, 691-92; Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1975); see also supra note
215 (remarks of Rep. Pepper).
317. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,782 (1979).
318. 45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1987).
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A program should be required to support its use of age with factual infor-
mation.319 A relationship between age and the characteristic measured
should not be presumed. Various kinds of proof may be offered to support a
direct relationship between age and the necessary characteristic. In ascend-
ing order of persuasiveness, the proof may include: testimony based upon
the experience of program administrators; expert opinion; empirical studies
of the general effects of aging and of the relationship of age to various physi-
cal and mental capacities; and, finally, professionally developed validity
studies of the use of age in a given program.
Depending upon the factors cited above-nature of the service, conse-
quences to the individual and to the program--courts and enforcement
agencies should vary the evidentiary showing necessary to support the use of
an age distinction. When the consequence to the excluded individual is the
loss of an important benefit, it may be appropriate to require at least some
empirical evidence of the relationship between age and the crucial
characteristic.
320
The more important question arises in deciding where the age line should
be drawn. Merely showing a relationship between age and a given character-
istic does not justify the use of any particular age cut-off. For example, even
if age is related to emotional maturity, it would not be reasonable to set age
thirty as the minimum age for driving motor vehicles.
Is it reasonable to use an age cut-off that screens out fifty percent of those
who are qualified, or thirty percent, or five percent? No certain answer to
this question exists in the ADA or in logic. A program should be required
to justify the chosen cut-off age by evidence that it will not exclude a sub-
stantial number of qualified individuals. What is considered substantial may
vary with the importance of the benefit or service and the program's interest
319. Although the ADEA cases do not explicitly discuss the type of proof necessary to
establish a relationship between age and the characteristic that it is measuring, the statute
seems to require a factual basis for linking the two factors. At least where an age criterion is
permitted because "all or substantially all" persons over or under that age are unqualified, the
employer must have "reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis" for, its conclusion.
See supra note 281.
320. The ADA does not really seem to question that there is a relationship between age
and the characteristics upon which age distinctions are based. No evidence exists to show that
Congress doubted the relationship of age and physical, mental, and emotional maturity in
children. Nor did anyone question the relationship between advancing age and poorer health
or physical decline. Rather than question these generalizations, the ADA seeks to prevent the
unfair application of a generalization to disadvantage an individual for whom the generaliza-
tion may not be true. Thus, the fourth prong of the test-requiring an individualized determi-
nation-may be the most crucial. Certainly, when the necessary characteristic can be
measured individually, age need not be used as a proxy. There will, however, be instances
where individualization will be impractical. In those cases, the relationship between age and
the necessary characteristic takes on added importance.
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in reducing the chance of selecting unqualified individuals.32" ' Here also, the
type of evidence required to demonstrate the impact of an age cut-off would
vary with the nature and consequences of the program.
The fourth prong of the normal operation exception is the heart of the
ADA. It is designed to prevent the use of age as a measure of qualification
when other means of making that determination are available. The HEW
regulations require individual evaluation of program beneficiaries unless
such an evaluation is "impractical." That standard should be applied flexi-
bly. Where the consequence to the individual is the loss of an important
benefit, individualization should be required if it is feasible and if it will not
undermine the normal operation of the program.
When the cost of individualized determinations becomes so great that it
would impair the operation of the program, it should not be required.322
Thus, the test would not require individualized determinations of the health
of pilots over sixty if, to be reliable, such determinations would have to be
made before every flight. Similarly, a special education program may have
financial resources to hire only enough teachers to teach children in three
grades. Although students might be selected individually from all grades,
the majority of students would not have teachers. In that case, individuali-
zation would impair the program's objectives.3 23
At the same time, other situations may exist where it may be feasible to
individualize, but only at great cost and inconvenience-and with little an-
ticipated benefit. 324 For example, it would be unnecessarily costly and bur-
321. In determining the constitutionality of gender classifications, the Supreme Court has
required a showing of a substantial relationship between gender and the characteristic for
which it is used as a proxy. The Court has rejected, as an insubstantial "fit," mandatory
dependency tests for men and not for women "even though it recognized that husbands are
still far less likely to be dependent on their wives than vice versa." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 202 n.13 (1976) (referring to Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Wein-
berger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)).
322. Although HEW seems to have rejected inconvenience and cost alone as justifications
for the use of an age distinction, the regulations do not actually preclude all consideration of
such factors. See supra note 287. At the very least, if the cost or administrative burden of the
individualized determinations is so great as to "impair [the] ability [of a program] to meet its
objectives," individualization should not be required. 45 C.F.R. § 90.13 (1987)
323. Indeed, Rep. Quie's remarks during debate on the ADA suggests this situation. See
supra note 180.
324. The example of the Head Start program found in the preamble to the HHS regulations
seems to suggest that individualization may not be required even though it is feasible. See
supra note 307. The preamble would allow the use of age as a proxy for level of development
and capacity for self-discipline even though it would seem to be possible to evaluate these
characteristics on an individual basis. 47 Fed. Reg. 57,850, 57,857 (1982).
Indeed, a review of the examples in the preamble to the HEW regulations suggests that the
agency may have been applying its standard differently to age distinctions that disadvantage
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densome to replace a minimum age for driving by an individualized test of
maturity. In that instance, a minimum age requirement represents a tempo-
rary disability that can be "outgrown." Therefore, the advantages of using a
uniform objective measure of qualification far outweigh the benefits of indi-
vidualizing. At the same time, when individualization is not required it
would be prudent to require greater proof of the relationship between age
and the characteristic to be measured.
III. THE USE OF AGE AS A CRITERION FOR
RATIONING MEDICAL CARE
Like its model-title VI-the ADA extends its protections only to indi-
viduals who participate or seek to participate in "a program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance." Such a program or activity may not
exclude, deny benefits, or discriminate against any person on the basis of age.
Thus, in applying the ADA to the rationing of medical care, several ques-
tions must be addressed: (1) Does the health care provider operate a pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance? (2) Does the manner
in which medical treatment is provided or denied by that program or activity
constitute exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination within the meaning
of the statute? In other words, are medical treatment decisions subject to
scrutiny under the ADA? (3) Does the consideration of age violate the pro-
hibition of the statute, or is it authorized by a statutory exception? In order
to provide a framework for discussion of these issues, this section of the
article will focus on the rationing of heart transplants.
As noted above, institutions that perform heart transplants have consid-
ered the age of prospective patients in evaluating their suitability as heart
transplant recipients. Typically, age has been employed as a criterion of ab-
solute exclusion.125 That is, individuals over the age of fifty-five have been
excluded from consideration.
older individuals than to those involving children and youth. Nevertheless, if the agency is
putting a gloss on the regulations, it should be made explicit.
325. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. There have been exceptions to this
general rule. See HCFA Ruling, supra note 72 at 13,641. If there is a consistent basis for
making exceptions, then the rule is not really a rule of absolute exclusion. On the other hand,
if the exceptions are simply made on an ad hoc basis, they do not alter the exclusionary nature
of the rule as it applies to most patients. Primary physicians and cardiologists use the articu-
lated criteria to advise patients about the availability of a heart transplant as a possible treat-
ment option and as a basis for referring patients to a transplant program. If articulated criteria
include an age cut-off, many prospective patients will never even seek a transplant.
Although the Medicare ruling does not read like a rule of absolute exclusion, it warns that
selection of a patient over 50 "must be done with particular care." Id. Since Medicare ap-
proval depends upon adherence to the patient selection criteria and achieving a high rate of
survival, it is likely that a hospital would apply this criteron narrowly. HHS has stated clearly
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Hospitals generally have a two-tiered selection process. Patients who are
referred by their own physicians are initially reviewed on the basis of their
medical records. If an individual passes this screening, he or she is given a
comprehensive individual evaluation, which may include taking a medical
history, a clinical examination, laboratory studies (including respiratory,
liver, and kidney function studies), a cardiac catheterization, a psychosocial
profile, a nutritional assessment, and an immunologic workup. 326 Selections
may be made by a medical review board, which consists of medical doctors
(including a cardiologist and cardiac surgeon), immunologists, hospital ad-
ministrators and social workers, 327 or by a more informal group of physi-
cians and other individuals. Age generally has been applied at the first level
to exclude the patient from an individual evaluation.328
After an individual is determined to be a suitable candidate for a heart
transplant, the individual's name is placed on a hospital's own waiting list or
a regional registry. When an organ procurement agency, which may be a
hospital or independent organization, obtains a donor heart, it attempts to
find the best recipient, largely from the names on a waiting list or registry.329
Priority generally has been given to those who have the best "match" '33 and
the most urgent need. 331 Thus, an individual whose name is not placed on a
waiting list or in a registry will have little chance of securing a heart
transplant.
that "an individual who fails to meet all the criteria would not be a suitable transplant candi-
date. Id. at 13,625.
326. See, e.g., Frazier, Cooley, Okereke, Van Buren & Kahan, Cardiac Transplantation at
the Texas Heart Institute: Recent Experience, 81 TEXAS MEDICINE, December 1985, at 48
[hereinafter Frazier]; Painvin, Frazier, Chandler, Cooley & Reece, Cardiac Transplantation:
Indications, Procurement, Operation and Management, 14 HEART AND LUNG 484 (1985)
[hereinafter Painvin].
327. Christopherson, Heart Transplants, in 12 "To MEND THE HEART": ETHICS & HIGH
TECHNOLOGY, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 18, 19 (1982). Frazier, supra note 326, at 48.
328. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
329. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at 65-66.
330. Heart transplant patients and donors are tested for incompatability of blood type.
Matching also is based on the size of the organ and the donor's geographic location. At pres-
ent, hearts can be maintained outside the body for only a matter of hours. This precludes
doing most tissue matching. It also places limitations on the distance a donor heart can be
transported. Id. at 66-67.
.331. Id. at 66. The Task Force on Organ Procurement and Transplantation recommended
that allocation of organs be based on criteria that consider need and probability of success. Id.
at 89. It noted that "[m]any believe that the fairest procedure is to use broad medical criteria
to establish the waiting list and then to use narrower medical criteria to determine who actu-
ally receives an available organ." Id. at 87.
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A. A Heart Transplant Program Is a Program or Activity Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance
Section 6102 of the ADA prohibits age discrimination in any "program or
activity receiving [flederal financial assistance. ' 332 The Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act of 1987333 amended, and thereby broadened, the scope of the
ADA by defining the term "program or activity" to include "all of the oper-
ations of... an... organization which is principally engaged in the business
of providing... health care... any part of which is extended Federal finan-
cial assistance. 13' Thus, the Civil Rights Restoration Act effectively over-
ruled part of Grove City College v. Bell,335 where the Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted the term "program or activity" in title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972.336 In Grove City, the Court held that because
the only program or activity receiving federal financial assistance was the
college's financial aid program, only that program-not the entire college-
332. 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982).
333. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 28 (to be
codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Civil Rights Restoration Act was enacted on
March 22, 1988 after Congress overrode a veto by President Ronald Reagan. See Dewar,
Congress Overrides Civil Rights Law Veto, The Wash. Post, March 23, 1988, at A-i, col. 5. In
addition to amending the ADA, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 5, the Act amends title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, id. § 3, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, id. § 4, and
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, id. § 6.
334. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 5 ((to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6107(4)(C)(i)(II)). Curiously,
Congress did not choose to amend § 6104(b) of the ADA, which, in addressing fund termina-
tion, specifies:
Any such [fund] termination or refusal shall be limited in its effect to the particular
program or activity, orpart of such program or activity, with respect to which such
finding [of age discrimination] has been made. No such termination or refusal shall
be based in whole or in part on any finding with respect to any program or activity
which does not receive Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
Representative Quie, the author of § 6104(b), explained that it was adopted to reject the so-
called "infection theory" which, he stated, HEW had used under title VI and title IX to reach
alleged discrimination in programs not receiving federal financial assistance and to use that as
a reason for terminating assistance to other programs. Representative Quie explained that
HEW's application of the "infection theory" had led Congress to amend title IX to exempt
school supported Boy and Girl Scout programs from coverage. According to Representative
Quie, this provision was needed to limit the scope of HEW's inquiry to the programs actually
supported by federal assistance. 121 CONG. REc. 37299 (1975). Given the broader definition
of program or activity contained in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 6104(b) would
seem to have little effect. Moreover, even prior to passage of that act, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d
1039 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1184 (1985), held that all inpatient and emergency
room operations of a hospital receiving Medicare and Medicaid were part of the program or
activity supported by the assistance. 736 F.2d at 1042.
335. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
336. Id. at 574-75.
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was subject to the provisions of title IX.337
By expanding the definition of "program or activity" in the ADA 338 to
encompass all of the operations of a health care organization, any part of
which receives federal financial assistance, the Civil Rights Restoration Act
renders a hospital's heart transplant program subject to the provisions of the
ADA if any part of the hospital receives federal financial assistance.
There seems to be little doubt that a hospital that participates in Medi-
care 339 or receives reimbursement under a state Medicaid program a4° re-
ceives federal financial assistance. In United States v. Baylor University
Medical Center,341 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that conclusion compelled by the legislative histories of title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 statute creating the health programs.
Baylor involved the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to hospital services.
At the time title VI was passed there were federal programs to reimburse
health care providers for medical care of the poor.342 The court of appeals
held that discrimination by hospitals and other medical facilities that re-
ceived federal funding through these programs was one of the specific targets
of title VI. 34 3 Moreover, during debate on the Medicare and Medicaid legis-
lation, several senators stated that the prohibitions of title VI would apply to
recipients of Medicare and Medicaid payments. 3" Although this issue was
337. IL
338. The Civil Rights Restoration Act similarly expanded the term "program or activity"
as used in title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 100-259, §§ 3, 4, 6, 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat) 28-30.
339. Under Medicare Part A, the government pays the hospital for certain in-hospital
treatment for covered aged and disabled persons. The program is financed entirely by payroll
tax deductions, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982), and federal payments may be made only to hospitals
which meet certain conditions of participation established by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. Id. § 1395(d)(2). See United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736
F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
340. The Medicaid program provides state governments with federal funds that the state,
after establishing a federally approved plan, uses to pay for medical aid for the poor and disad-
vantaged. 42 U.S.C. § 1396; see Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1044.
341. 736 F.2d 1039 (1984).
342. Id. at 1044. Among these programs was the Kerr-Mills program of health care for the
poor, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1982). See 110 CONG. REC. 13,132 (1964). The Medicaid legisla-
tion passed in 1965 was an expansion of that program.
343. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1044. For example, Representatives Lindsay, McCulloch, Cahill,
Shriver, MacGregor, Mathias, and Bromwell expressed the view that title VI would prohibit
racial discrimination in "vendor payments for medical care of public assistance recipients.
Hospitals, nursing homes, and clinics in all parts of the country participate in these programs."
110 CONG. REC. 1661 (1964).
344. See, e.g., Ill CONG. REC. 15,803 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff) (in order to receive
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not extensively debated, the court noted that no member of Congress ex-
pressed a contrary view.345
The similarity of structure, language, and purpose of the several statutes
prohibiting discrimination in federally funded programs-title VI, title IX,
and section 504-requires that they be interpreted consistently; the legisla-
tive history and judicial construction of an earlier statute is highly relevant
to interpretation of a later-enacted law.346 Thus, in Baylor, the court rea-
soned that because section 504 uses language identical to that of title VI to
describe the statute's coverage, the legislative history of title VI is relevant in
interpreting section 504.3 "7 The same principle applies when interpreting
the coverage of the ADA, which was also patterned after title VI and which
uses the same language.
Grove City laid to rest any argument that Medicare and Medicaid are fi-
nancial assistance only to the individual beneficiary and not to the recipient
hospital.3 48 In Grove City, the Supreme Court held that Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants-federal grants extended to college students for college
expenses-are federal financial assistance within the meaning of title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, even when the aid is given directly to
the student and not to the college.3 49 An even stronger argument can be
made that Medicare and Medicaid payments, which are made directly to
health care providers, are federal financial assistance to the providers.
The Court, in Grove City, also rejected the argument that the education
grants were analogous to food stamps, Social Security benefits, welfare pay-
ments, and other forms of general-purpose governmental assistance to low-
federal payments, hospitals would have "to abide by Title VI"); 111 CONG. REC. 15,813 (1965)
(remarks of Sen. Hart); id. (remarks of Sen. Pastore). The court noted the particular impor-
tance of the remarks of Senators Ribicoff and Pastore who were closely involved in passage of
both title VI and the health legislation. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1045 n.14.
345. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1045.
346. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 683-85 (1979).
347. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1043, 1045, 1047.
348. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 did not alter the section of the Grove City
opinion that concluded that federal financial assistance directly awarded to individual benefi-
ciaries is "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of title IX.
349. 465 U.S. at 569-70. The Court rejected any distinction between direct aid to institu-
tions and indirect aid received through individual student beneficiaries. Id. at 564. The Court
noted that the "economic effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable ...
and the [student aid] program was structured to ensure that it effectively supplemented the
College's own financial aid program." Id. at 565. Students receive grants to pay for the educa-
tion they receive at a particular college or university. Their eligibility is conditioned on contin-
ued enrollment. The amount of the grant is based on the cost of attendance, and students must
sign affidavits stating that their awards will be used solely for expenses related to attendance.
Id. at 565 n.13.
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income families, which do not invoke statutory coverage.35° In support of
its conclusion, the Court noted that, unlike general assistance, an individ-
ual's eligibility for educational assistance is tied to attendance at an educa-
tional institution, and that the assistance is designed to aid the educational
institution."' Furthermore, educational institutions may withdraw from
federal student assistance programs. 52
Similarly, as the Fifth Circuit held in Baylor, Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments to hospitals for the care of individual beneficiaries are federal financial
assistance. Medicare and Medicaid payments are dependent upon the bene-
ficiary receiving care from a participating health care provider. Providers
may withdraw from the program. The Medicare and Medicaid programs
provide some assistance to hospitals in meeting their statutory and common
law obligations to provide care to the indigent.3"3 The fact that Medicare
and Medicaid assistance is provided to hospitals for the care of individual
beneficiaries does not distinguish it from a whole host of federal programs
that provide funding so that individuals may provide services to the ultimate
beneficiaries of federally assisted programs.35 4
Because hospitals that participate in Medicare and Medicaid are recipients
of federal financial assistance, all of the operations of such hospitals are sub-
ject to compliance with the ADA. This includes heart transplant programs,
even if the transplant programs themselves do not participate in Medicare
and Medicaid 355 and are completely segregated from other hospital services
350. Id. at 565 n.13.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. A private hospital has no general duty to provide care to those who cannot pay. See,
e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959). Where, however, a hospital
has a custom of providing emergency care it may be legally obligated to provide emergency
care on demand to patients who rely on this custom. See, e.g., Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz.
608, 611, 617 P.2d 774, 777 (1980), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Thompson v. Sun City
Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984). In addition, once a hospital
admits a patient, it may not unreasonably discharge the patient and will be liable for any harm
suffered by the patient as a result of the premature discharge. See, e.g., Le Juene Rd. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Hospitals that receive federal
financial assistance for construction under the Hill-Burton Act have an obligation to provide
some care to those who cannot pay. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982). Public hospitals may have
specific statutory and constitutional obligations to indigent patients.
354. During the debate on title VI, Congress was provided lists of programs that would be
covered. The list included expenditures for school districts, student loans, hospital construc-
tion, maternal and child health, and low income housing assistance. 110 CONG. REc. 13,380-
82 (1964).
355. This is unlikely because Medicare now covers heart transplants and 24 states pay for
heart transplants under their Medicaid programs. See supra notes 59, 72, and accompanying
text.
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that do participate in Medicare and Medicaid. 3 6
356. One further issue arises with respect to Medicare and Medicaid. Like title VI, the
ADA specifically exempts from coverage a federal "contract of insurance or guaranty." Sec-
tion 6103 provides that:
[t]he head of each Federal department or agency which extends Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity by way of grant, entitlement, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, shall transmit to the Secretary [of
HEW, now HHS], and publish in the Federal Register, proposed regulations to carry
out the provisions of section 6102 ....
42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982). The language of title VI is similar. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
In Baylor, the hospital argued that Medicare and Medicaid were insurance programs and
therefore exempt from coverage. The court found, however, that Medicare is not the kind of
insurance that Congress intended to exempt from the coverage of title VI. Baylor, 736 F.2d at
1048-49. The legislative history of title VI, see 110 CONG. REC. 2500 (1964) (comments of
Rep. Celler); id. at 6545 (comments of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6566 (analysis of House bill); id.
at 9090 (comments of Sen. Gore); id. at 13,378 (comments of Sen. Humphrey), indicates that
Congress intended to prevent title VI from reaching "individually owned homes financed with
federally guaranteed mortgages, or individual bank accounts in a bank with federally guaran-
teed deposits," because it did not "want Title VI to effect a nationwide Fair Housing Act."
Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1048.
In contrast to this kind of voluntary, individually financed, agreement, Medicare is a
mandatory program, financed by mandatory payroll taxes. Like Social Security, which is fi-
nanced in the same way, Medicare benefits are noncontractual in nature and do not create
property rights in the beneficiary. In so holding in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960),
the Supreme Court noted:
The Social Security system may be accurately described as a form of social insurance,
enacted pursuant to Congress' power to "spend money in aid of the general welfare,"
... whereby persons gainfully employed, and those who employ them, are taxed to
permit the payment of benefits to the retired and disabled, and their dependents.
Plainly the expectation is that many members of the present productive work force
will in turn become beneficiaries rather than supporters of the program. But each
worker's benefits, though flowing from the contributions he made to the national
economy while actively employed, are not dependent on the degree to which he was
called upon to support the system by taxation. It is apparent that the noncontractual
interest of an employee covered by the Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of
the holder of an annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual pre-
mium payments.
Id, at 609-10.
Although the legislators used the term "insurance" when referring to Medicare, it was
meant in the sense of "social insurance." Indeed, the bill was variously described as "social
insurance," "social legislation," or "assistance for the elderly." See 111 CONG. REC. 7228
(1965) (comments of Rep. King); id. at 7355 (comments of Rep. Farbstein); id. at 15,630
(comments of Sen. Anderson); id. at 15,836 (comments of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,882, 18,513
(comments of Sen. Fong).
Medicaid in no way resembles a program of insurance. It provides federal assistance to
states which administer an approved program of health care for the poor and disadvantaged.
The Baylor court likened it to other assistance programs which were covered by title VI such
as the school lunch program. 736 F.2d at 1049; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1764; see, e.g., 110
CONG. REC. 2487 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler) (discussion of school lunch program); id.
at 6545 (comments of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7101 (comments of Sen. Javits); 42 U.S.C. § 291
(1982) (the Hill-Burton program for hospital construction); see, e.g., discussion of Hill-Burton
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B. The ADA Applies to Medical Decisionmaking
Arguably, the ADA does not apply to medical treatment decisions. Con-
gress, the argument goes, certainly did not contemplate the ADA intruding
upon the practice of medicine. State law currently governs the reasonable-
ness of a medical treatment decision, and federal agencies and courts should
not be in the business of creating federal malpractice standards. Moreover, a
deviation from acceptable standards is not the kind of "discrimination" that
the ADA was intended to prevent. Nor is there any evidence that a federal
scheme is needed to protect patients.
Unlike consideration of race, which is unrelated to the choice of a medical
treatment, age is generally a relevant consideration. The very existence of
specialists in pediatrics and geriatrics is proof of the unique medical needs of
different age groups. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected the applicability of section 504 to medical treatment deci-
sions involving handicapped infants for just this reason: "Where the handi-
capping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if
ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
'discriminatory.' "357
There is considerable appeal to this argument. Age will often be relevant
in medical decisionmaking, and evaluating its relevance is a difficult and
highly technical matter that requires the expertise of scientists and physi-
cians. Moreover, state law seems to be an adequate safeguard for the ran-
dom failure of an individual provider to afford adequate medical care.35 8
Nevertheless, the argument that medical decisionmaking is excluded from
the scope of the ADA must fail.
In Bowen v. American Hospital Association,359 the Supreme Court was
unanimous in its affirmation that "handicapped infants are entitled to 'mean-
ingful access' to medical services provided by hospitals, and ... a hospital
rule or state policy denying or limiting such access would be subject to chal-
lenge under Sec. 504." 360 A qualified individual who is not even considered
Act, 110 CONG. REC. 1661 (comments of Rep. Lindsay, et al.); id. at 6544 (comments of Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 7063 (comments of Sen. Pastore); id. at 13,376 (comments of Sen. Alcott).
357. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). Although the
court relied upon the "otherwise qualified" language of § 504, its reasoning seems equally
applicable to the ADA.
358. Cf Hoyt v. St. Mary's Rehabilitation Center, 711 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1983) (dis-
missal of a § 504 claim alleging that nursing home had discriminated against resident by failing
to provide adequate care because "[i]n substance, this is a medical malpractice case").
359. 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying
text.
360. 476 U.S. at 624. There was no majority opinion in Bowen. The five to four judgment
was announced in a plurality opinion signed by only four justices. Chief Justice Burger con-
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for a heart transplant because of his or her age is certainly denied meaningful
access to that medical service. The fact that the denial is based upon "medi-
cal criteria" devised by physicians should not alter that conclusion. 36'
The fact that age may sometimes be relevant to medical treatment, more-
over, does not end the inquiry. With the passage of the ADA, Congress
created a presumption against the use of age based upon untested generaliza-
tions. The whole purpose of the statute is to test whether, in a given in-
stance, age is a valid criterion.
In Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, the employer sought to justify its use
of age on the basis of a reasonable medical judgment about the effects of
aging. 36  The Supreme Court stated that even reasonable medical judgment
would not automatically be accepted, but would be subjected to closer scru-
363 Cortiny. The Court reasoned that, under the ADEA, even a valid generaliza-
tion would not justify an age test unless a more individualized method of
evaluation was unavailable.3 "4
Moreover, the fact that age may be relevant in choosing the most appro-
priate medical treatment does not mean that every use of age as a criterion is
influenced only by medical considerations. Physicians are not unlike the rest
curred in the result. Id. at 648. Three dissenters would have gone even further in upholding
the application of § 504 to individual denials of treatment. Id. at 650-56 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. Id. at 648.
361. There is little doubt that the ADA applies to health services, which were specifically
mentioned in the 1975 House report. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
Moreover, the ADA, as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, specifically
mentions organizations principally engaged in the business of providing health care. Pub. L.
No. 100-259, § 5, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 30 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6107(4)(C)(i)(II)).
In Bowen, the American Medical Association argued that § 504 was not applicable to physi-
cians' decisions to deny treatment to handicapped infants in individual cases. Brief for the
American Medical Association, at 42-44, Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610
(1986). The Supreme Court avoided this "medical thicket," however, by expressly declining to
decide whether § 504 applied to individual treatment decisions. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 624.
Nevertheless, the denial of medical treatment on the basis of age certainly comes within the
terms of the statutory prohibition. To paraphrase Justice White, dissenting in Bowen,
[t]hat some or most failures to treat may not fall within [the ADA], that discerning
which failures to treat are discriminatory may be difficult, and that applying [the
ADA] in this area may intrude into the traditional functions of the State do not
support the categorical conclusion that the [Act] may never be applied to medical
decisions.
Id. at 655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
However difficult it may be to decide whether the ADA governs random medical treatment
decisions of individual providers, a hospital's denial of access to a heart transplant program
because of the patient's age clearly comes within the protection of the statute.
362. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 406 (1985); see also supra note 262.
363. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 423.
364. Id. at 422-23.
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of the population. They have predispositions and biases. They may see
those of advancing age as "a bit crumbly" and, therefore, less likely to be
benefitted by medical treatment. 365 This willingness to accept unjustified
generalizations about the effects of aging is the very reason the ADA sub-
jects age distinctions to closer scrutiny.
Indeed, physicians may have their own ideas about the efficient use of
health care resources. It may seem a better use of resources to preserve the
life of one who will live longer and be more productive. Thus, a longevity
rationale may be partly responsible for considering age in making a treat-
ment decision. The statute should be applied to expose the basis for using
age in treatment decisions.
To be sure, physicians should be given considerable discretion in exercis-
ing medical judgment, involving, as it does, a mix of art and science, and of
intellect and intuition.31 6 The physician should have discretion to weigh the
benefits and risks and choose the best treatment for the patient. But where a
hospital establishes a treatment protocol that rations medical care, a physi-
cian who follows that protocol cannot claim immunity in order to preserve
the autonomy of his or her medical judgment. The physician is not deciding
what is best for the individual patient; rather, the physician has assumed the
responsibility of choosing among patients to decide which patient should be
provided care.
The decision to ration, even on the basis of medical criteria, is a policy
judgment, not a medical judgment.3 67 There is no more reason to insulate
the physician's judgment from examination than to insulate the judgment of
anyone else. Policy judgments about rationing medical care are not the
traditional province of the medical professional. The physician has no par-
ticular expertise in this area and, as a consequence, no unusual deference is
due his or her decision. While physicians are by no means eager to become
rationing agents, if they are forced into that role they will be making social
policy decisions. They cannot be considered immune from legal constraints
simply because those policy decisions appear in the guise of medical
decisions.
The conclusion should not be different where there is no explicit policy of
using an age test. The civil rights laws do not distinguish between a stated
365. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., E. PELLIGRINO & D. THOMASINA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE 70 (1981) ("Clinical judgment is anticipatory, based on the organization of the
body, the environment, past clinical experience, values of the patient, and scientific
knowledge.").
367. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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policy and a consistent practice that has the same purpose and effect. 368 Ex-
plicit policies are easily converted into implicit understandings. For that
reason, inquiry into individual decisions should be permitted in order to de-
termine whether the denial of treatment was random or was part of a consis-
tent practice.
The patient selection criteria of a heart transplant program are those of
the individual professionals who operate that program. If no individual
decisionmaker will consider someone over the age of fifty-five for a trans-
plant, the program must be viewed as having a policy denying access to
those above that age.
C. The Use of Age to Exclude Individuals from Consideration for a Heart
Transplant May Violate the ADA
The use of age as a criterion to exclude individuals from consideration for
heart transplantation violates the basic prohibition of section 6102 of the
ADA. A person over the age of fifty-five is "excluded from participation in
[a] program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" and the exclu-
sion is "on the basis of age." The use of age can be upheld only if it comes
within one of the statutory exceptions or exemptions of section 6103. Of the
five exceptions and exemptions, only the normal operation exception is
relevant. 369
At the outset, subjecting an age criterion to this standard requires an an-
swer to the essential question: Why is the program considering age? With
368. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
369. The use of age as a patient selection criterion for heart transplantation is not author-
ized by any law. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982). Although use of an age criterion is permitted
by the 1987 HCFA ruling, see supra note 72, this is insufficient to bring the practice within the
"any law" exemption. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text. Nor is it based upon
reasonable factors other than age," 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(B), because age "is exactly what it
is based on." Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 713 (1978). In
Manhart, the Court rejected the argument that since sex was used as a proxy for longevity, sex-
based actuarial tables were based on "any factor other than sex" within the meaning of the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). 435 U.S. at 712-13. The similarly worded exception to the ADA
is confined to facially neutral criteria which have a disproportionate effect on persons of a
particular age. When an age criterion is used as a proxy for some other nonage factor, it is
appropriately tested under the normal operation, 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(A ) (first clause); see
also supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text, and statutory objective exceptions, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6103(b)(1)(A) (second clause).
The statutory objective exception does not apply to the use of age in a hospital heart trans-
plant program. The program or activity receiving federal financial assistance is the hospital's
program of medical care. That program was not created by, and does not operate pursuant to,
a federal statute.
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heart transplants, age is being used to ration a limited commodity. Given
the limited number of donor hearts available for transplantation, institutions
are trying to make wise cost-benefit assessments. Why, then, do they choose
age as a rationing criterion?
The expressed rationale for an age test is a medical one. The National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute's guidelines designate "advancing age" as a
contraindication for heart transplantation because, it states, at around age
fifty or fifty-five an individual "begins to have a diminished capacity to with-
stand postoperative complications."
370
Age does not measure whether an individual is medically unsuitable for a
heart transplant. Individuals over the age of fifty-five can, and have, sur-
vived heart transplants. Even today, some transplants are being performed
on individuals over the age of fifty-five.3 7 1 Indeed, an increase in the availa-
bility of donor hearts would undoubtedly lead to a relaxation of this stan-
dard by raising the age cut-off.372 Even medical criteria are responsive to
availability, as experience with kidney dialysis demonstrated.373
Age is a test, not of absolute, but of relative medical efficacy-to screen
out those least expected to achieve clinical success. Early in the days of
heart transplant programs, the patient selection criteria were adjusted by
lowering the age cut-off because of high rates of morbidity and mortality
among those over age fifty.
374
The National Heart Transplantation Study found a statistically significant
correlation between age at the time of transplantation and ability to survive a
heart transplant. The study examined 419 individuals who had received
heart transplants between 1968 and 1983. In each of several age groups, it
compared the number who were alive and the number who had died. Of
those ages thirty to thirty-nine at the time they received a transplant, fifty
percent were still alive at the time of the study; of those ages forty to forty-
nine, thirty-nine percent were still alive; and of those over age fifty, twenty-
one percent were still alive.375
Thus, age is considered a measure of relative likelihood of survival.
370. 46 Fed. Reg. 7072, 7073 (1981).
371. As of 1985, the Texas Heart Institute had raised its age cut-off to 60. See Frazier,
supra note 326, at 48.
372. THE HASTINGS CENTER, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO
SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT 7 (Oct. 1985) (Report of the Project on Organ
Transplantation).
373. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
374. See Christopherson, supra note 327, at 19.
375. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22 at ES-47, Table ES-15. The study does not
define survival. Moreover, it measures survival rates based on those who were alive in 1983,
without any indication of how long the deceased recipients had lived. For example, an individ-
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Transplants are reserved for age groups whose members are, taken as a
group, more likely to survive. That reasoning, however, does not fully ex-
plain the use of age as an absolute exclusionary factor. Unless age is a con-
trolling factor-because all or substantially all persons over the age of fifty-
five are less likely to survive than those who are accepted into the program-
the exclusion of those over age fifty-five raises questions about the purpose of
an age cut-off.
Why is age used to exclude individuals from consideration when individu-
alized evaluations are being performed anyway?376 The scientific basis for a
total exclusion of those over age fifty-five is admittedly weak.377
Physicians may be acting out of an abundance of caution. But in so doing
they are also readily accepting untested generalizations about the effects of
aging. Moreover, these generalizations correspond with common notions
about the "social worth" of older persons. Perhaps the use of an age test
reflects, in some part, the desire to save the lives of those who will live longer
and lead more productive lives.
The normal operation test must be applied to determine the validity of
using a maximum age cut-off to exclude individuals from an opportunity to
receive a heart transplant. Certainly, in this instance, a strict application of
the standard is appropriate. From the individual patient's standpoint, the
consequence of being excluded from the program is certain death. 78
The test of reasonable necessity requires that the characteristic measured
by age be legitimate, that it be essential to the normal operation of the pro-
gram (without substantially impairing its objectives), that it can be reason-
ably measured by age, and that it would be impractical to measure that
characteristic by individualized evaluations.379 Under the first prong of the
ual who received a transplant in 1968 could have lived five years. On the other hand, a recipi-
ent of a transplant in 1983 may have lived only one year.
The study concluded that differences based upon age were statistically significant. That is,
they did not occur by chance. 3 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8,
at 21-26.
376. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
377. The only study of the relationship between age and survivability was that conducted
by the National Heart Transplantation Study. The study recognized that further investigation
was necessary to justify the use of age as a patient selection criterion. 4 NATIONAL HEART
TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 36-34 ("It is important to develop the empirical
data that would, in fact, show the relationship between advancing age and successful outcome
of cardiac transplantation.").
378. Of course, providing a transplant to one who has little likelihood of surviving is a
waste of a very scarce resource. The ADA, however, would not require that every individual
over age 55 who could benefit be given a heart transplant. At most, it would require an indi-
vidualized determination of probability of success.
379. See supra notes 258-85 and accompanying text.
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normal operation test, the use of an age test to ration heart transplants
would appear to violate the ADA if its purpose is to maximize the benefits of
the program by limiting transplants to those who, because of their age, are
perceived to derive the greatest benefit for the longest period of time.
Whether benefit is measured by expected years of extended life or by the
value of the individual's life once he or she has reached a certain age, if it is
based on the notion that the value of saving the lives of those over the age
cut-off is lessthan the value of saving the lives of younger people, it reflects
an illegitimate purpose.
The effect on older individuals is a good reason to view this use of age with
skepticism, requiring a close inquiry into the reason for utilizing age. At the
same time, age is clearly related to the likelihood of survival and there is
probably widespread agreement that medical efficacy is a reasonable basis
upon which to ration scarce medical resources. 380 Resolution of the second
prong of the normal operations test might turn on whether a court sees the
use of age in transplant programs as a measure of social worth or a legiti-
mate factor used to determine medical efficacy. If a court was convinced
that targeting by age was really for purposes of medical efficacy, it would be
hard pressed to declare such an objective invalid.
380. The preamble to the Medicare heart transplant regulations is quite clear in expressing
its rationale for strict patient selection criteria: "[T]he use of criteria that would permit the
transplantation of hearts to patients with only a small likelihood of survival could lead to
circumstances in which a scarce resource would be wasted." See HCFA Ruling, supra note 72
at 13,625. If the purpose of the age cut-off is to maximize the rate of clinical success by
choosing only those who are relatively more likely to survive, it may be an acceptable objec-
tive. But, reasonable persons may differ about whether it is essential to the normal operation
of a heart transplant program. Perhaps all patients who have a reasonable chance of surviving
should have an equal opportunity to receive a heart transplant. If age is a reasonable means of
measuring probability of success, why has it not been applied as a criterion across the board,
giving priority to those who are 30-39 years old?
While the normal operation of a heart transplant program may require rationing, it does not
mandate any particular form. There is no consensus on the basis for rationing scarce re-
sources, largely because there has been little rationing of medical care in this country. While
physicians have practiced triage when required by emergency situations, even in triage no
uniform practice emerges.
"Triage" is the practice of sorting patients according to their medical needs under crisis or
emergency conditions, when not all can be treated immediately. Childress, Triage in Neonatal
Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547, 551 (1983). First devel-
oped for use in military situations, it has been extended to civil disasters and emergency rooms.
Id. at 559. Triage systems are based on a utilitarian rationale: to produce the greatest good for
the greatest number, serve the common good, or meet human needs most effectively and effi-
ciently. Id. at 551. What is considered efficient, however, may depend upon the context.
Although all triage involves sorting patients by need, priorities for treatment may differ. In an
emergency room those most in need of medical care will be treated first. Id. at 550. Under
wartime conditions physicians may first treat those who can be returned to active duty. Id. at
551-52.
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Under the third prong of the normal operation test, the program must
show that age is a good measure of the necessary characteristic. The Na-
tional Heart Transplantation Study demonstrates a statistically significant
relationship between age of transplant recipients and survival. Moreover,
the cut-off age of fifty or fifty-five is reasonable in light of the sharp drop in
rate of survival between those in the forty to forty-nine age group and those
over age fifty. 38 I Based upon that professionally conducted study alone,
courts might reasonably conclude that the third prong of the test is met.
Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that twenty-one percent of those over
age fifty survived transplants. Given the consequences to the individual of
failure to secure a heart transplant, a court might well conclude that the use
of a cut-off of age fifty or fifty-five screens out a substantial number of quali-
fied recipients, and therefore should be struck down.
The fourth prong of the normal operation standard requires a program to
forego the use of age unless it is impractical to measure the crucial character-
istics by individualized evaluation. Heart transplant programs have other
criteria upon which to base an individualized evaluation.38 2 If some persons
over the age of fifty-five can qualify after individualized evaluation, the ADA
seems to prohibit absolute exclusion on the basis of age.
This may be true even if age is relevant to determining relative
survivability. If race, for example, measured the relative likelihood of sur-
vival, it is unlikely physicians would approve its use without strong evidence
that it is an essential means of predicting outcome. Similarly, the ADA, at
least in this context, creates a presumption against the unnecessary use of an
age test.
The question, then, is whether it is necessary to exclude all individuals
over the age of fifty-five from consideration. Certainly, there is some corre-
lation between age and many diseases,"' some of which are contraindica-
tions to heart transplantation. 384 The individualized evaluation, however, is
designed to uncover the presence of disease.
What, then, does age tell the physician that cannot be determined through
individualized evaluation? With advanced age comes a decrease in some-
thing gerontologists call "reserve capacity"-the ability to recover from ma-
jor surgery.3" 5 It is not clear whether this is a characteristic that cannot be
381. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
383. See Koin, Surgical Concerns, in 2 GERIATRIC MEDICINE 275 (C. Cassel & J. Walsh,
eds. 1984).
384. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
385. Many physiologic functions decline with age. J. FRIES & L. CRAPO, VITALITY AND
AGING: IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECTANGULAR CURVE 32 (1981). Normal, healthy orga-
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measured by any means other than an estimate based upon the individual's
age. The relevant proxy for this characteristic is not chronologic age, but
physiologic age.3 86 Moreover, the importance of this factor in the context of
heart transplantation has not been explored.
While the age of a prospective heart transplant recipient may provide
some information to physicians that the medical examination does not, the
importance of that information to accurate prediction of clinical success is
unclear.387 It provides only one piece of a large puzzle. The process of esti-
mating the success of a heart transplant in a given patient is very complex
and, while it involves some scientific information, it, like many other medical
decisions, is still largely impressionistic.388 Because there is no formula for
making the choice, it is difficult to determine whether the information pro-
vided by knowing an individual's age is so important that it should control
the decision.389 Ultimately, this is a question of fact on which experts might
differ.
nisms maintain an excess reserve capacity beyond immediate functional needs. Id. The mean
level of reserve in many organs, however, declines with age. Id. at 33; see also Koin, supra note
383, at 275. Healthy organisms, under assault from destructive external forces (such as sur-
gery), regulate their bodily functions through the process of homeostasis, to return them to
their original integrity. J. FRIES & L. CRAPO, supra at 34. The ability of the body to maintain
homeostasis declines with decreasing organ reserve. Id. When homeostasis cannot be main-
tained, the organism dies. Id. From this, some have argued that diminished physiologic re-
serve affects the ability of an individual to deal with the stress of surgery. See Koin, supra note
383, at 275.
Even if it is generally true that those over 50 have diminished reserve capacity, they fre-
quently undergo major surgery. 4 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note
8, at 36-34. Moreover, the rate of decline of physiologic functions differs among individuals
and among organisms. J. FRIES & L. CRAPO, supra at 34. While some say this decline cannot
be quantified, there is some indication that it can be measured in the individual. See id. at 33.
The variation in physiologic age of healthy people of the same chronologic age is far greater
than the variation due to age. Watts & McCally, Demographic Perspectives, in 2 GERIATRIC
MEDICINE, 3, 7 (C. Cassel & J. Walsh, eds. 1984)
Immunologic function also declines with age. One medical authority, however, points out
that there is little evidence linking a depressed immune function with subsequent illness.
Goodwin, Immunology, in I GERIATRIC MEDICINE, 299 (C. Cassel & J. Walsh, eds. 1984)
("Evidence that links depressed or disordered immune function in humans to a subsequent
morbidity and/or mortality is scarce. Most authorities simply have assumed that a decline in
immune function is deleterious, or they have used theoretic arguments to support this belief.").
386. 4 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 36-29.
387. Id. at 36-34.
388. D. MECHANIC, supra note 90, at 20.
389. Another way of analyzing this issue is to look at age as a measure of "reserve capac-
ity." The question then becomes whether, under the second prong of the test, reserve capacity
is a characteristic which must be measured in order to continue the normal operation of the
program. If a reasonably accurate evaluation can be made without measuring reserve capac-
ity, age may not be used. This analysis, however, would seem to preclude any consideration of
age.
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A reasonable interpretation of the ADA would allow physicians to con-
sider age as one factor in the individualized evaluation of medical suitability
for a heart transplant, rather than regarding age as an exclusionary criterion
precluding individualized evaluation. This interpretation is desirable for a
number of reasons. It allows the consideration of a relevant factor which
may be otherwise unmeasurable, thus reducing the risk of error, but it does
not preclude the otherwise healthy fifty-six or even sixty-five year old from
fair consideration. Such an approach serves the purposes of the ADA by
avoiding the use of unnecessary generalizations without unduly burdening
the program. For this reason, perhaps, the preamble to the HEW regula-
tions favors this approach.39°
The approach has practical advantages as well. It avoids the need to
choose a specific cut-off age, thereby eliminating the arbitrariness of such a
choice. Finally, it avoids the appearance of using age as a measure of social
worth.39 1
D. The Future Use of Age to Ration Medical Care
Age is currently used to ration heart transplants. Health care providers
may be using age to ration other medical care as well. As this Article has
discussed, concern about cost containment makes future rationing on the
basis of age a real possibility. In each case where a hospital establishes a
treatment protocol or engages in a consistent practice of considering a pa-
tient's age, that practice is subject to scrutiny under the ADA.
This does not mean that federal law will intrude every time a physician
considers the age of his or her patient in deciding upon an appropriate treat-
ment. Individual medical decisions would not be subject to review. How-
ever, where physicians engage in a consistent practice of denying patients
access to a medical treatment because of their age, the ADA can be invoked.
390. The preamble states:
HEW encourages recipients to apply age distinctions flexibly; that is, to permit a
person, upon a proper showing of the necessary characteristic to participate in the
activity or program even though he or she would otherwise be barred by the age
distinction. Other things being equal, an age distinction is more likely to qualify
under one of the statutory exceptions if it does not automatically bar all those who do
not meet the age requirements.
44 Fed. Reg. at 33,773 (1979).
391. Of course, it can be argued that consideration of age as one factor leaves open the
possibility of more subtle discrimination which still operates to exclude individuals on the basis
of age. Nevertheless, this is preferable to use of an age-based criterion which inevitably leads
to exclusion on the basis of age. Without reason to conclude otherwise, we should presume the
good faith of physicians in applying a facially neutral process which weighs age fairly against
other factors. Cf Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (Powell, J.
concurring).
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Such a consistent practice denies the excluded individual meaningful access
to treatment at that hospital.392 The fact is, however, that the impetus for
rationing is more likely to come from hospital administrators concerned
about budgetary problems, than it is to come from physicians, who are reluc-
tant rationing agents.
The results of such scrutiny will not always be the same.39 3 Each time an
inquiry is made into a particular use of an age criterion, two issues arise.
First, is age being used as a rationing device? Second, is age a necessary
medical criterion or would some other criterion be an adequate substitute?
A hospital may not wish to acknowledge that it is rationing and will at-
tempt to justify the use of an age criterion on other grounds. But unless a
medical treatment would not possibly be beneficial, rationing seems to be the
only justification for limiting its availability on the basis of age. Thus, if the
hospital is to uphold its selection criteria, it will be forced to admit that it is
rationing.
The result, under the ADA, is not certain. A court may find that a hospi-
tal has no choice but to ration if, as with heart transplants, there is a natural
scarcity of critical medical resources. That conclusion might be different,
392. Hospitals have general authority to grant or deny staff privileges. See generally
Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J.
452 (1978). Whatever the limits to this authority, it would seem to extend to denying privi-
leges to those who are engaging in unlawful discrimination.
393. Of course, the result of scrutinizing explicit age criteria may be the adoption of objec-
tive criteria which have a disproportionate impact on older persons as a group. This should
not be a significant concern.
The statute creates an exception for age distinctions based upon "reasonable factors other
than age." 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(B) (1982). The HEW regulations require that a neutral
factor which has an adverse impact on a given age group, may not be sustained unless it bears
a "direct and substantial relationship to the normal operation of [a] program or activity." 45
C.F.R. § 90.15 (1987). The EEOC ADEA regulations interpret a similarly worded statutory
exception to require that the nonage factor be justified by "business necessity." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.7(d) (1987). While the HEW test is somewhat less stringent than that for the ADEA, it
still seems to be an inappropriate interpretation of the ADA because it essentially imposes an
"effects" test.
A test of rationality seems more consistent with the language and purposes of the ADA.
The statute refers to "reasonable" factors other than age. The evil at which the ADA was
primarily directed was not prejudice against any age group, but, rather, the unquestioning
acceptance of untested generalizations about age. Congress rejected the Civil Rights Commis-
sion's definition of age discrimination as any action with an adverse effect on any age group.
Only where the use of objective factors is a pretext for discrimination on the basis of age
should that use be struck down under the ADA, such as where a hospital can show no reason-
able basis for use of the factor. The burden of showing the reasonableness of the factors should
remain on the program which employs them. Of course, the longevity rationale cannot be
upheld as a reasonable factor other than age. Moreover, a cost rationale cannot be considered
reasonable when it singles out those of a particular age group because they are more costly to
serve. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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however, if the scarcity is created artificially through budget restraints on
health providers. Under such circumstances, rationing is more difficult to
justify as'a valid program objective, especially if the rationed treatment is
life-saving. Common acceptance of the "life-saving imperative" could make
rationing an improper purpose of the medical program of a hospital. The
very fact that the rationing has been hidden may convince a court that it is
not a valid program objective. On the other hand, a court might reject this
argument as judicial overreaching; the antidiscrimination laws were not in-
tended to control neutral program objectives, but simply to assure the even-
handed treatment of individuals within the confines of a given program.
In each case, the court will then need to examine the use of age as a ra-
tioning criterion. The court will focus on separating the use of age as a
measure of medical efficacy from other uses. Age requirements based upon
longevity or other social worth rationales will be invalidated. The validity of
using age as a medical criterion will depend upon the condition being treated
and the extent of scientific knowledge and medical experience. Health prov-
iders will not be able to rely upon untested generalizations. With the growth
of scientific knowledge about aging, and its effects, the results may change.
As the National Heart Transplantation Study noted, more research is
needed to justify the use of age as a patient selection criterion.3 94
Judicial inquiry into these issues may result in striking down some hospi-
tal protocols. Even where they are upheld, however, the very fact that hid-
den rationing is exposed will have an impact on health care policy. When
these issues are aired publicly, rationing will survive only if a consensus de-
velops on the need to ration and the means by which rationing decisions
should be made. Society may reject cost containment efforts because of their
effect on the availability of medical care to the elderly and other disadvan-
taged groups. Or it may decide that some rationing is necessary. For exam-
ple, society may decide that we should devote fewer resources to prolonging
the life of terminally ill patients.
If society chooses to ration, medical efficacy is a fair basis for deciding
who should receive medical care. We will want physicians to be central to
the decisionmaking process. What we should not accept, however, is hidden
rationing where health providers alone are making all of the decisions about
what to ration and who to exclude.
As difficult as it may be for Congress to adopt a rationing scheme, the
legislature is the most appropriate forum for examining competing concerns
and interests, and for formulating a policy which reflects a consensus. If
society cannot adopt a rationing policy openly, it should not do so at all.
394. 4 NATIONAL HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 36-34.
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